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Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation

Author

Listed:
  • Acharya, Viral
  • Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia
  • Sundaresan, Suresh
Abstract
We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments have limited financial commitment and can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing involves government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to commit not to expropriate which improves private sector incentives and project quality. The model captures several other features prevalent in infrastructure financing such as government co-investment, tax subsidies, development rights, and cross-guarantees.

Suggested Citation

  • Acharya, Viral & Parlatore Siritto, Cecilia & Sundaresan, Suresh, 2022. "Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation," CEPR Discussion Papers 15288, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15288
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Double moral hazard; Public private partnerships; Government guarantees; Development rights; General obligation bonds; Revenue only bonds;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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