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Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Demougin
  • Carsten Helm
Abstract
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both tasks. Compared to the efficient solution, more employees exert both tasks and effort in the routine task is inefficiently large. As work overload in the routine task is decoupled from a corresponding increase in remuneration, employees perceive a loss of control to allocate effort between the two tasks. Reductions in employees’ bargaining power and improvements in monitoring technologies aggravate the issue.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2022. "Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 9753, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9753
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multi-tasking; work overload; routine tasks; rent extraction; moral hazard; limited liability; Nash Bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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