Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cgd/wpaper/10.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development

Author

Listed:
  • Lant Pritchett

    (Center for Global Development)

  • Michael Woolcock

    (World Bank)

Abstract
The welfare of the poor turns in large measure not only on technocratic development "policies", but the effective delivery of key public services, core elements of which require thousands of face-to-face discretionary transactions ("practices") by service providers. The importance of (often idiosyncratic) "practices" was largely ignored in the 1960s and 70s, however, as planners in developing countries sought to rapidly emulate the service delivery mechanisms of the developed countries, namely standardized (top-down) "programs" managed by a centralized civil service bureaucracy. Although this approach could claim some notable successes in poor countries, it soon became readily apparent that it had failed early and often in virtually all sectors. Three common civil service reforms in the 1980s also yielded disappointing results, so in the 1990s scholars and practitioners began to tout more radical "participatory" (or bottom-up) proposals for improving service delivery. These new proposals have generated a series of unusual alliances and antagonisms in contemporary development debates. We attempt to unravel these debates by distinguishing between the original solution and eight current proposals for improving service delivery, on the basis of a principal-agent model of incentives that explores how these various proposals change flows of resources, information, decision-making, delivery mechanisms, and accountability. We briefly assess the arguments made by proponents and detractors of each approach, and suggest some of the implications of this framework for education, research, and those charged with improving service delivery.

Suggested Citation

  • Lant Pritchett & Michael Woolcock, 2002. "Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development," Working Papers 10, Center for Global Development.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cgdev.org/publication/solutions-when-solution-problem-arraying-disarray-development-working-paper-10
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kanbur Ravi, 2001. "Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of Disagreements," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 122-145, April.
    2. Julie van Domelen, 2002. "Social funds: evidence on targeting, impacts and sustainability," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 627-642.
    3. Miller,Gary J., 1992. "Managerial Dilemmas," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521372817.
    4. Isham, Jonathan & Narayan, Deepa & Pritchett, Lant, 1995. "Does Participation Improve Performance? Establishing Causality with Subjective Data," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 9(2), pages 175-200, May.
    5. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
    6. Soniya Carvalho & Gillian Perkins & Howard White, 2002. "Social funds, sustainability and institutional development impacts: findings from an OED Review," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 611-625.
    7. Anthony Bebbington & Scott Guggenheim & Elizabeth Olson & Michael Woolcock, 2004. "Exploring Social Capital Debates at the World Bank," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(5), pages 33-64.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    9. Roubini, N., 1989. "Offset And Sterilization Under Fixed Exchange Rates With An Optimization Central Bank," Papers 568, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
    10. Jonathan Isham, 2002. "The Effect of Social Capital on Fertiliser Adoption: Evidence from Rural Tanzania," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 11(1), pages 39-60, March.
    11. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2002. "Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 375-394, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele, 2010. "Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 699-731, September.
    2. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
    3. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, April.
    4. Grootaert, Christiaan, 1999. "Social capital, houshold welfare, and poverty in Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2148, The World Bank.
    5. Ghazala Mansuri, 2004. "Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical Review," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 19(1), pages 1-39.
    6. Goldman, Eitan & Slezak, Steve L., 2006. "An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 603-626, June.
    7. Hadem, Michael, 2010. "Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des Wechsels von Finanzvorständen - Eine Analyse in großen börsennotierten Unternehmen," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 43681, September.
    8. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    9. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2014_002 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Laurence E. Lynn Jr. & Carolyn J. Hill, 2001. "Producing Human Services: Why Do Agencies Collaborate?," JCPR Working Papers 219, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
    11. Che, Jiahua & Chung, Kim-Sau & Lu, Yang K., 2017. "Decentralization and political career concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 201-210.
    12. Glaeser, Edward L. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Not-for-profit entrepreneurs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 99-115, July.
    13. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Itzhak Ben‐David & Francesco Franzoni & Augustin Landier & Rabih Moussawi, 2013. "Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(6), pages 2383-2434, December.
    15. Suárez Serrato, Juan Carlos & Wang, Xiao Yu & Zhang, Shuang, 2019. "The limits of meritocracy: Screening bureaucrats under imperfect verifiability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 223-241.
    16. Gosnell, Greer & Metcalfe, Robert & List, John A, 2016. "A new approach to an age-old problem: solving externalities by incenting workers directly," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84331, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Robert Gibbons, 2010. "Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 337-365, September.
    18. Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi, 2014. "Bankers' compensation: Sprint swimming in short bonus pools?," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2014, Bank of Finland.
    19. Hartarska, Valentina M., 2005. "Governance in Rural Community Development Financial Institutions," 2005 Agricultural and Rural Finance Markets in Transition, October 3-4, 2005, Minneapolis, Minnesota 132755, Regional Research Committee NC-1014: Agricultural and Rural Finance Markets in Transition.
    20. repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201503041096 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why Do Politicians Delegate?," NBER Working Papers 11531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Ramirez, Matias & Bernal, Paloma & Clarke, Ian & Hernandez, Ivan, 2018. "The role of social networks in the inclusion of small-scale producers in agri-food developing clusters," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 59-70.
    23. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Publications Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cgdevus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.