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Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations

Author

Listed:
  • Gani Aldashev
  • Marco Marini
  • Thierry Verdier
Abstract
Mission-driven nonprofi?t organizations compete for donations through fundrais- ing activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonpro?fits impose ex- ternalities on each others? output. This paper studies the design of sustainable voluntary cooperation agreements, using a game-theoretic model of alliance formation. Two key char- acteristics determine the stability of cooperation: the alliance formation rule and whether the fundraising efforts of nonprofi?ts are strategic complements or substitutes. Both affect the incentives to deviate from the cooperative agreement (by one or several nonpro?ts). We propose conditions on the alliance formation protocols that facilitate the stability of Pareto-optimal cooperation in fundraising.

Suggested Citation

  • Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 293, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:293
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2020. "Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(630), pages 1541-1582.
    2. Faraz Usmani & Marc Jeuland & Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, 2018. "NGOs and the effectiveness of interventions," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-59, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Maccarrone, Giovanni & Marini, Marco A. & Tarola, Ornella, 2023. "Shop Until You Drop: the Unexpected Effects of Anticonsumerism and Environmentalism," FEEM Working Papers 330384, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    4. Astrid SIMILON, 2015. "Self-Regulation Systems for NPO Coordination: Strenghts and Weaknesses of Label and Umbrella Mechanisms," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 89-104, March.
    5. Kopel, Michael & Marini, Marco A., 2022. "Mandatory disclosure of managerial contracts in NGOs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 65-85.
    6. Gani ALDASHEV & Cecilia NAVARRA, 2018. "Development Ngos: Basic Facts," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 125-155, March.
    7. Amihai Glazer & Rune Jansen Hagen & Jørn Rattsø, 2018. "Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 302-321, May.
    8. Tobias Cagala & Ulrich Glogowsky & Johannes Rincke & Anthony Strittmatter, 2021. "Optimal Targeting in Fundraising: A Causal Machine-Learning Approach," Papers 2103.10251, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    9. repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:125-155 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Gallier, Carlo & Goeschl, Timo & Kesternich, Martin & Lohse, Johannes & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2023. "Inter-charity competition under spatial differentiation: Sorting, crowding, and spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 457-468.
    11. Gayle, Philip & Harrison, Teresa, 2023. "Competition and Strategic Responses to Fundraising in Donative Markets," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2024-9, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, revised 01 Aug 2024.
    12. Michael Kopel & Marco A. Marini, 2020. "Mandatory Disclosure of Managerial Contracts in Nonprofit Organizations," Working Papers 23/20, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
    13. Lange, Andreas & Price, Michael K. & Santore, Rudy, 2017. "Signaling quality through gifts: Implications for the charitable sector," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 48-61.
    14. Tobias Cagala & Ulrich Glogowsky & Johannes Rincke & Anthony Strittmatter, 2021. "Optimal Targeting in Fundraising: A Machine-Learning Approach," Economics working papers 2021-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    15. Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2016. "Information, competition, and the quality of charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 64-77.
    16. Crettez, Bertrand & Hayek, Naila & Zaccour, Georges, 2020. "Do charities spend more on their social programs when they cooperate than when they compete?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(3), pages 1055-1063.
    17. Ester Manna, 2023. "Bad NGOs? Competition in the market for donations and workers' misconduct," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/457, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    18. Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2017. "Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," Working Papers 6/17, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    nonprofits; giving; coordination; endogenous coalition formation; non-distribution constraint.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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