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Central bank forward guidance and the signal value of market prices

Author

Listed:
  • Stephen Morris
  • Hyun Song Shin
Abstract
The analysis suggests that relying less on market signals increases the effectiveness of central bank communication. In their eagerness to correctly anticipate policy moves, market participants risk giving too much weight to central bankers' utterances and not enough to assessing economic data. If central bankers, in turn, trust markets to guide their actions, they may end up creating a feedback loop that cancels out the value of the very market signals they rely on. In this circular relationship, market outcomes reflect central bank actions, which in turn reflect market outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2018. "Central bank forward guidance and the signal value of market prices," BIS Working Papers 692, Bank for International Settlements.
    • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:692
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Svensson, Lars E. O. & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 661-690, January.
    2. Aoki, Kosuke, 2006. "Optimal commitment policy under noisy information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 81-109, January.
    3. Amador, Manuel & Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2012. "Learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 910-940.
    4. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2005. "Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 36(2), pages 1-66.
    5. Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation forecasts and monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 653-686.
    6. Michael Woodford, 1994. "Nonstandard Indicators for Monetary Policy: Can Their Usefulness Be Judged from Forecasting Regressions?," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy, pages 95-115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Itay Goldstein & Emre Ozdenoren & Kathy Yuan, 2011. "Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 263-292.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2024. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 425-457, June.
    2. Michael Ehrmann & Paul Hubert, 2022. "Information Acquisition ahead of Monetary Policy Announcements," Working papers 897, Banque de France.
    3. Herbert Sylvérie, 2022. "State-dependent Central Bank Communication with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 875, Banque de France.
    4. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Observing and Shaping the Market: The Dilemma of Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(8), pages 1973-2005, December.
    5. Jonathan G. James & Philip Lawler, 2024. "Clarity of Central Bank Communication and the Social Value of Public Information," Working Papers 2024-03, Swansea University, School of Management.
    6. Boris Hofmann & Dora Xia, 2022. "Quantitative forward guidance through interest rate projections," BIS Working Papers 1009, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Ngomba Bodi, Francis Ghislain & Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Soulemanou, Soulemanou, 2020. "Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ? [Central Bank's Transparency and effectiveness of ," MPRA Paper 116436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Nathan Sussman & Osnat Zohar, 2022. "Have Inflation Expectations Become Un-anchored? The Role of Oil Prices and Global Aggregate Demand," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 18(2), pages 149-192, June.
    9. Nathan Sussman & Osnat Zohar, 2016. "Has Inflation Targeting Become Less Credible? Oil Prices, Global Aggregate Demand and Inflation Expectations during the Global Financial Crisis," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2016.13, Bank of Israel.
    10. Picault, Matthieu & Raffestin, Louis, 2020. "The other side of forward guidance: Are central banks constrained by financial markets?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    11. Prasanna Gai & Sherry X. Wu, 2023. "On Market‐Friendly Central Bankers," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 99(325), pages 238-252, June.
    12. Thomas Lubik & Christian Matthes & Elmar Mertens, 2023. "Indeterminacy and Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 37-57, July.
    13. Hauk, Esther & Lanteri, Andrea & Marcet, Albert, 2021. "Optimal policy with general signal extraction," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 54-86.
    14. Kawamura, Kohei & Kobashi, Yohei & Shizume, Masato & Ueda, Kozo, 2019. "Strategic central bank communication: Discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan’s Monthly Report," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 230-250.
    15. Vedolin, Andrea & Leombroni, Matteo & , & Whelan, Paul, 2018. "Central Bank Communication and the Yield Curve," CEPR Discussion Papers 12970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Gai, Prasanna & Lou, Edmund & Wu, Sherry X., 2020. "Targeted disclosure and monetary policy flexibility: A simple model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    17. Monica Jain & Walter Muiruri & Jonathan Witmer & Sharon Kozicki & Jeremy Harrison, 2023. "Summaries of Central Bank Policy Deliberations: A Canadian Context," Discussion Papers 2023-2, Bank of Canada.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank communication; market expectations; crowding out;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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