Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ave/wpaper/272005.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy: Where has the Former Been, Where is the Latter Going?

Author

Listed:
  • Stephen Martin

    (Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University)

Abstract
The earliest U.S. antitrust laws were adopted after technological changes — most importantly, the development of a national railway network — made the U.S. political union a single economic market. They were adopted with the stated, and no doubt largely sincere, purposes of preventing collusion and strategic entry-deterring behavior. Early application of the antitrust laws relied on a rule of competition to determine whether business conduct was or was not permitted. This has evolved into an explicit evaluation of the impact of businesses practices on consumer welfare, conceived of and measured in an economic sense. EU competition policy was adopted in advance of economic integration. It differed sharply from the traditional policies of the original EC6 member states toward business behavior. It was adopted with the stated, and most likely sincere, purpose of furthering economic integration, and to this end prohibited practices that were seen as distorting competition. Early applications of competition policy, particularly in the European Coal and Steel Community, may have had perverse effects. There are indications of an evolution towards an economic performance standard in the European Union as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Martin, 2005. "U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy: Where has the Former Been, Where is the Latter Going?," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 27, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro.
    • Handle: RePEc:ave:wpaper:272005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ua.pt/egi/ReadObject.aspx?obj=11011
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hiroshi Ohta & Jacques-François Thisse (ed.), 1993. "Does Economic Space Matter?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-22906-2, December.
    2. Marburg, Theodore F., 1964. "Government and Business in Germany: Public Policy toward Cartels," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 78-101, April.
    3. Phlips,Louis, 1983. "The Economics of Price Discrimination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521283946, October.
    4. Libecap, Gary D, 1992. "The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 242-262, April.
    5. Robert H. Porter, 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn.
    6. Anonymous, 1958. "European Coal and Steel Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 257-260, April.
    7. McCurdy, Charles W., 1978. "American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 631-649, September.
    8. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 33, pages 2145-2220, Elsevier.
    9. Granitz, Elizabeth & Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-47, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alvaro Montenegro García, 2007. "Fundamentos de la política de la competencia," Documentos de Economía 3930, Universidad Javeriana - Bogotá.
    2. Annette Bongardt, 2005. "Competition Policy and EU Governance," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 28, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, September.
    2. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    3. Hüschelrath, Kai, 2008. "Is it Worth all the Trouble? The Costs and Benefits of Antitrust Enforcement," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-107, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    5. Phillip Lederer, 2011. "Competitive Delivered Pricing by Mail-Order and Internet Retailers," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 315-342, June.
    6. Jean-Marc Siroën, 1993. "Marchés contestables, différenciation des produits et discrimination des prix," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(3), pages 569-592.
    7. Juan‐Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzman, 2010. "Output‐Expanding Collusion In The Presence Of A Competitive Fringe," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 106-126, March.
    8. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2011. "Price Discrimination," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 447-469, June.
    10. Suguru Otani, 2024. "Industry Dynamics with Cartels: The Case of the Container Shipping Industry," Discussion Paper Series DP2024-28, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    11. D'Annunzio, Anna & Russo, Antonio, 2015. "Net Neutrality and internet fragmentation: The role of online advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 30-47.
    12. Chen, Yutian & Dubey, Pradeep & Sen, Debapriya, 2011. "Outsourcing induced by strategic competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 484-492, July.
    13. Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland, 2012. "The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 265-276.
    14. Dongling Huang & Christian Rojas & Frank Bass, 2008. "What Happens When Demand Is Estimated With A Misspecified Model?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 809-839, December.
    15. Grubb, Farley, 2010. "Testing for the Economic Impact of the U.S. Constitution: Purchasing Power Parity Across the Colonies versus Across the States, 1748–1811," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 118-145, March.
    16. Claire Borsenberger & Helmuth Cremer & Denis Joram & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Estelle Malavolti, 2020. "Platform Competition: Market Structure and Pricing," Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, in: Pier Luigi Parcu & Timothy J. Brennan & Victor Glass (ed.), The Changing Postal Environment, pages 225-240, Springer.
    17. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
    18. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2008. "Upstream Market Foreclosure," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 13-26, January.
    19. Shogo Mizutaka & Kousuke Yakubo, 2017. "Structural instability of large-scale functional networks," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(7), pages 1-11, July.
    20. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2012. "Abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 518-527.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    US antitrust policy; EU competition policy; European Union; Economic governance; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ave:wpaper:272005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marta Ferreira Dias (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deavept.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.