Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/anp/en2005/042.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Risco E Competição Bancánria No Brasil

Author

Listed:
  • Luiz Alberto D´Ávila de Araújo
  • Paulo de Melo Jorge Neto
Abstract
One of the most relevant discussions on bank regulation is the dichotomy between liberalization, with higher competition, and financial stability. To investigate this problem, the article examines competitive conditions and risk taking in Brazilian banks, and investigates their interrelationship. Competition is measured using Panzar & Rosse model and risk taking by Basel Brazilian Index. Given the relevance of the discussion between Allen & Gale, Grochulski & Kareken and Kahn a measure of concentration was used as a proxy for competition. It is shown that Brazilian banks operate in monopolist competition and that competition increases risk taking. However, competition is not significance to explain credit offer.

Suggested Citation

  • Luiz Alberto D´Ávila de Araújo & Paulo de Melo Jorge Neto, 2005. "Risco E Competição Bancánria No Brasil," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33rd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 042, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2005:042
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2005/artigos/A05A042.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anp:en2005:042. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rodrigo Zadra Armond (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/anpecea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.