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Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

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  • Finus, Michael
  • Rundshagen, Bianca
  • Eyckmans, Johan
Abstract
We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.

Suggested Citation

  • Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca & Eyckmans, Johan, 2009. "Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?," Sustainable Development Papers 55830, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemdp:55830
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.55830
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    Cited by:

    1. Hillebrand, Elmar & Hillebrand, Marten, 2023. "Who pays the bill? Climate change, taxes, and transfers in a multi-region growth model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    2. Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2020. "The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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