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Erfolgsabhängige Vergütung: Ein sicherer Weg zur Steigerung der Leistung von Top-Managern?

Author

Listed:
  • Zwick, Thomas
  • Wolf, Elke
  • Beblo, Miriam
Abstract
Dieser Beitrag zeigt auf Basis einer Befragung von Führungskräften eines internationalen Konzerns, unter welchen Bedingungen eine erfolgsabhängige Vergü-tung einen positiven Motivationseffekt erzielen kann. Neben einer positiven Ent-wicklung der Bonusauszahlung können weitere Faktoren die Motivationswirkung des Vergütungssystems stärken. Hierzu zählen vor allem die allgemeine Zustimmung zum System, eine geringe Volatilität der Berechnungsgrundlage, das Gefühl, die Auszahlung durch eigene Leistung beeinflussen zu können, und eine gute Informationspolitik des Unternehmens während der Einführungsphase.

Suggested Citation

  • Zwick, Thomas & Wolf, Elke & Beblo, Miriam, 2002. "Erfolgsabhängige Vergütung: Ein sicherer Weg zur Steigerung der Leistung von Top-Managern?," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-72, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:533
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24393/1/dp0272.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. French, Stephen & Kubo, Katsuyuki & Marsden, David, 2001. "Does performance pay de-motivate, and does it matter?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3637, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Erfolgsabhängige Vergütung; Motivation; Leistungsanreize; Führungskräfte;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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