Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/17070.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Matching schemes and public goods: A review

Author

Listed:
  • Epperson, Raphael
  • Reif, Christiane
Abstract
Matching schemes, where a party matches the contribution of others, reduce the effective price of a good and aim to foster its demand. We review the empirical literature on the effectiveness of these schemes in the context of public goods, especially in the field of charitable giving. As different measures of effectiveness are used, we classify results according to (i) the level of public good provision, (ii) the amount of individuals’ contributions, (iii) the likelihood to give and (iv) the contribution conditional on contributing a positive amount. Generalizing results is challenging, since context specific factors matter. Predominantly, a match is found to create a significant increase in public good provision without crowding out individuals’ contributions, while the effect on the likelihood of giving and contribution condition on contributing a positive amount is nonnegative. The discussion reveals several avenues for future research, as putting stronger emphasizes on long term effects, public good competition or heterogeneity in responses.

Suggested Citation

  • Epperson, Raphael & Reif, Christiane, 2018. "Matching schemes and public goods: A review," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-070, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, revised 2018.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17070
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/180389/1/dp17070.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-1093, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Daniel Rondeau & John List, 2008. "Matching and challenge gifts to charity: evidence from laboratory and natural field experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(3), pages 253-267, September.
    3. Steffen Huck & Imran Rasul & Andrew Shephard, 2015. "Comparing Charitable Fundraising Schemes: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment and a Structural Model," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 326-369, May.
    4. John List, 2008. "Introduction to field experiments in economics with applications to the economics of charity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(3), pages 203-212, September.
    5. Charness, Gary & Frechette, Guillaume R. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2007. "Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 287-306, August.
    6. Dean Karlan & John A. List, 2007. "Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1774-1793, December.
    7. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011. "Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 639-645.
    8. Christiane Reif & Dirk Rübbelke & Andreas Löschel, 2017. "Improving Voluntary Public Good Provision Through a Non-governmental, Endogenous Matching Mechanism: Experimental Evidence," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 559-589, July.
    9. Meer, Jonathan, 2017. "Does fundraising create new giving?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 82-93.
    10. Karlan, Dean & List, John A. & Shafir, Eldar, 2011. "Small matches and charitable giving: Evidence from a natural field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 344-350.
    11. Wolfgang Buchholz & Josef Falkinger & Dirk Rübbelke, 2014. "Non-Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two-Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(6), pages 899-916, December.
    12. Huck, Steffen & Rasul, Imran, 2011. "Matched fundraising: Evidence from a natural field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5-6), pages 351-362, June.
    13. Stephan Meier, 2007. "Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(6), pages 1203-1222, December.
    14. Boadway, Robin & Pestieau, Pierre & Wildasin, David, 1989. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 157-176, July.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4809 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July.
    17. John A. List, 2011. "The Market for Charitable Giving," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 157-180, Spring.
    18. Adena, Maja & Huck, Steffen, 2017. "Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 32-42.
    19. Douglas Davis & Edward Millner & Robert Reilly, 2005. "Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(2), pages 85-106, June.
    20. Adena, Maja & Huck, Steffen, 2017. "Matching Donations Without Crowding Out?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 16, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    21. repec:feb:natura:0053 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2003. "Rebate versus matching: does how we subsidize charitable contributions matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 681-701, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Molina, Chai & Akcay, Erol & Dieckmann, Ulf & Levin, Simon & Rovenskaya, Elena A., 2018. "Combating climate change with matching-commitment agreements," SocArXiv 7yc3g, Center for Open Science.
    2. Jiang, Bixia & Bai, Xu & You, Weijia & Fan, Kun, 2021. "Where and how to launch your forestry crowdfunding campaign? Evidence from China," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Krasteva, Silvana & Saboury, Piruz, 2021. "Informative fundraising: The signaling value of seed money and matching gifts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    2. Indranil Goswami & Oleg Urminsky, 2018. "No Substitute for the Real Thing: The Importance of In-Context Field Experiments In Fundraising," Natural Field Experiments 00660, The Field Experiments Website.
    3. Saboury, Piruz & Krasteva, Silvana & Palma, Marco A., 2022. "The effect of seed money and matching gifts in fundraising: A lab experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 425-453.
    4. Indranil Goswami & Indranil Goswami, 2020. "No Substitute for the Real Thing: The Importance of In-Context Field Experiments in Fundraising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(6), pages 1052-1070, November.
    5. Adena, Maja, 2021. "How can we improve tax incentives for charitable giving? Lessons from field experiments in fundraising," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 344-353.
    6. Adena, Maja & Huck, Steffen, 2022. "Personalized fundraising: A field experiment on threshold matching of donations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 1-20.
    7. Maja Adena & Rustamdjan Hakimov & Steffen Huck, 2024. "Charitable Giving by the Poor: A Field Experiment in Kyrgyzstan," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(1), pages 633-646, January.
    8. Daniel M. Hungerman & Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2021. "Impure Impact Giving: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(5), pages 1553-1614.
    9. Adena, Maja & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Huck, Steffen, 2019. "Charitable giving by the poor: A field experiment on matching and distance to charitable output in Kyrgyzstan," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2019-305, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. Zhiyuan Gao & Zhiling Guo & Qian Tang, 2022. "How do monetary incentives influence giving? An empirical investigation of matching subsidies on kiva," Information Systems and e-Business Management, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 303-324, June.
    11. Gallier, Carlo & Goeschl, Timo & Kesternich, Martin & Lohse, Johannes & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2023. "Inter-charity competition under spatial differentiation: Sorting, crowding, and spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 457-468.
    12. Kesternich, Martin & Löschel, Andreas & Römer, Daniel, 2016. "The long-term impact of matching and rebate subsidies when public goods are impure: Field experimental evidence from the carbon offsetting market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 70-78.
    13. Laura Gee & Michael Schreck, 2016. "Do Beliefs About Peers Matter for Donation Matching? Experiments in the Field and Laboratory," Framed Field Experiments 00538, The Field Experiments Website.
    14. Jiang, Bixia & Bai, Xu & You, Weijia & Fan, Kun, 2021. "Where and how to launch your forestry crowdfunding campaign? Evidence from China," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    15. Adena, Maja & Huck, Steffen, 2017. "Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 32-42.
    16. Deck, Cary & Murphy, James J., 2019. "Donors change both their level and pattern of giving in response to contests among charities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 91-106.
    17. Adena, Maja & Huck, Steffen, 2017. "Matching Donations Without Crowding Out?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 16, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    18. Robert Neumann, 2019. "The framing of charitable giving: A field experiment at bottle refund machines in Germany," Rationality and Society, , vol. 31(1), pages 98-126, February.
    19. Shusaku Sasaki & Hirofumi Kurokawa & Fumio Ohtake, 2022. "An experimental comparison of rebate and matching in charitable giving: The case of Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 147-177, January.
    20. Gee, Laura Katherine & Schreck, Michael J., 2017. "Do Beliefs about Peers Matter for Donation Matching? Experiments in the Field and Laboratory," IZA Discussion Papers 10956, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    literature review; matching schemes; charitable giving; public goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17070. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zemande.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.