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Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Derek Pyne

    (York University, Canada)

Abstract
This paper attempts to explain how lobbying expenditures can influence the outcome of an election fought over trade policy. Voters are assumed to own both capital and labour. The expenditures of lobby groups act as a signal to voters of the difference in returns to their factor endowments under different political parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Derek Pyne, 1997. "Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies," Working Papers 1997_03, York University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:yca:wpaper:1997_03
    as

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    File URL: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/pub/working_papers/97-03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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