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Marriage payments and bargaining power of women in rural Bangladesh

Author

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  • Nazia Mansoor
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between bargaining power and the use of contraceptives in the household. Using data from rural Bangladesh in 1998-1999 it investigates whether women in a relatively strong bargaining position at the time of marriage continue to remain in a strong position post marriage as seen by their decision to use the contraceptive pill. Empirical results from multinomial logit provide evidence for this showing that as brideprice, taken as a fraction of total household marriage payment, increases from 0.1 to 0.3 the predicted probability of the mother using the contraceptive pill increases by 8 percentage points.

Suggested Citation

  • Nazia Mansoor, 2011. "Marriage payments and bargaining power of women in rural Bangladesh," Studies in Economics 1119, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    • Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1119
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    File URL: https://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/repec/1119.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hotte, Rozenn & Lambert, Sylvie, 2023. "Marriage payments and wives’ welfare: All you need is love," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage market; marriage payments; female bargaining power; contraceptive use; rural Bangladesh;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General

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