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Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared

In: 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2

Author

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  • Francesco Parisi

    (George Mason University)

Abstract
This paper compares the adversarial system of adjudication, dominant in the common law tradition, with the inquisitorial system, dominant in the civil law tradition, using a rent-seeking, Nash equilibrium, model of litigation expenditure in which the litigants simultaneously choose their levels of effort with the goal of maximizing their returns from the case. The choice between the two systems is modeled as a continuous variable showing the equilibrium solutions of the game and their implications for procedural economy. The results are then utilized to characterize the optimal levels of adversarial and inquisitorial discovery with respect to the social benefits of truth-finding and correct adjudication, and the private and administrative costs of litigation.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Parisi, 2002. "Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 397-420, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_23
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_23
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hause, John C, 1989. "Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 157-179, January.
    2. Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February.
    3. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-288, September.
    4. Froeb, Luke M & Kobayashi, Bruce H, 1996. "Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 257-276, April.
    5. Robert D. Tollison & Roger D. Congleton (ed.), 1995. "The Economic Analysis Of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 592.
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