Better than Ploughing
In: Recollections of Eminent Economists
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-09776-0_12
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Other versions of this item:
- James M. Buchanan, 2013. "Better than Ploughing," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 59-76.
References listed on IDEAS
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006.
"The Power to Tax,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, October.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
Public Choice; Choice Setting; Public Debt; Political Agent; Public Choice Theory;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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