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Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

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  • Federico Echenique
Abstract
The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Echenique, 2003. "Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(1), pages 33-44, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:1:p:33-44
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0277-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Hoffmann, Eric, 2016. "On the learning and stability of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 349-362.
    4. Sunanda Roy & Tarun Sabarwal, 2008. "On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October.
    5. Cao, Zhigang & Chen, Xujin & Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Wang, Changjun & Yang, Xiaoguang, 2018. "Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 45-51.
    6. Ewerhart, Christian & Sun, Guang-Zhen, 2024. "The n-player Hirshleifer contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 300-320.
    7. Arora, Gaurav, 2017. "Studies on factors affecting the evolution of agroecosystems in the Dakotas," ISU General Staff Papers 201701010800006258, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    8. Arora, Gaurav & Feng, Hongli & Hennessy, David A. & Loesch, Charles R. & Kvas, Susan, 2021. "The impact of production network economies on spatially-contiguous conservation– Theoretical model with evidence from the U.S. Prairie Pothole Region," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    9. Lu Yu, 2024. "Nash equilibria of quasisupermodular games," Papers 2406.13783, arXiv.org.
    10. Sachin Adlakha & Ramesh Johari, 2013. "Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Strategic Complementarities," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 971-989, August.

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    Keywords

    Keywords and Phrases: Supermodular games; Strategic complementarities; Mixed strategy equilibria; Learning.; JEL Classification Numbers: C72; C73.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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