Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/compsc/v30y2013i3p286-303.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Issue linkage and international cooperation: An empirical investigation

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Poast
Abstract
Issue linkage—the simultaneous discussion of two or more issues for joint settlement—is a bargaining tactic that (1) increases the probability of states reaching a negotiated agreement and (2) motivates states to remain committed to an agreement. Unfortunately, beyond some suggestive case studies and a few indirect statistical tests, there exists no direct and systematic evidence to support either claim. To empirically identify the effect of issue linkage, one must overcome five difficulties: properly evaluating multilateral processes, identifying issue linkage, identifying failed negotiations, identifying enforcement problems, and accounting for missing linkage data. I address these limitations through a variety of new approaches, most notably a new unit of analysis (the k -ad) for analyzing multilateral events, new data on failed military alliance negotiations, and using “buffer states†to test the credibility of alliance commitments. I find that, for military alliance negotiations from 1860 to 1945, offers of trade cooperation provisions increase the probability of states reaching agreement and improve the credibility of those agreements. However, I also find that offers of trade cooperation do not have a positive effect on alliance negotiations from 1815 to 1859.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Poast, 2013. "Issue linkage and international cooperation: An empirical investigation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(3), pages 286-303, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:30:y:2013:i:3:p:286-303
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894213484030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0738894213484030
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0738894213484030?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles F. Manski, 1997. "Monotone Treatment Response," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1311-1334, November.
    2. Tollison, Robert D. & Willett, Thomas D., 1979. "An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 425-449, October.
    3. D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam, 2000. "Eugene : A conceptual manual," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 179-204, March.
    4. Barry Eichengreen & Jeffry Frieden, 1993. "The Political Economy Of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 85-104, July.
    5. Sebenius, James K., 1983. "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 281-316, April.
    6. Poast, Paul, 2012. "Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 277-310, April.
    7. J. Michael Greig, 2005. "Stepping Into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(2), pages 249-266, April.
    8. James Honaker & Gary King, 2010. "What to Do about Missing Values in Time‐Series Cross‐Section Data," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 561-581, April.
    9. King, Gary & Zeng, Langche, 2001. "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 137-163, January.
    10. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1162-1176, December.
    11. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2001. "Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    13. Kyle Beardsley, 2008. "Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 723-740, October.
    14. Hoekman, Bernard M., 1989. "Determining the need for issue linkages in multilateral trade negotiations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 693-714, October.
    15. Huth, Paul K., 1988. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 423-443, June.
    16. Mayer, Frederick W., 1992. "Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 793-818, October.
    17. Brett Leeds & Jeffrey Ritter & Sara Mitchell & Andrew Long, 2002. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 237-260, July.
    18. Davis, Christina L., 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(1), pages 153-169, February.
    19. King, Gary & Honaker, James & Joseph, Anne & Scheve, Kenneth, 2001. "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(1), pages 49-69, March.
    20. Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "European Monetary Unification," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1321-1357, September.
    21. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 379-406, July.
    22. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-384, October.
    23. repec:fth:michin:248 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Mebane, Walter R. & Poast, Paul, 2013. "Causal Inference without Ignorability: Identification with Nonrandom Assignment and Missing Treatment Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 233-251, April.
    25. Kydd, Andrew H., 2006. "When Can Mediators Build Trust?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 449-462, August.
    26. Fazal, Tanisha M., 2004. "State Death in the International System," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 311-344, April.
    27. Leeds, Brett Ashley, 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 801-827, October.
    28. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 761-799, October.
    29. Pahre,Robert, 2008. "Politics and Trade Cooperation in the Nineteenth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521872744, October.
    30. Favretto, Katja, 2009. "Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 248-263, May.
    31. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 593-629, July.
    32. Poast, Paul, 2010. "(Mis)Using Dyadic Data to Analyze Multilateral Events," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 403-425.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vanessa A. Lefler, 2015. "Strategic forum selection and compliance in interstate dispute resolution," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(1), pages 76-98, February.
    2. Susanne Lohmann, 1997. "Linkage Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 38-67, February.
    3. Jesse C. Johnson & Brett Ashley Leeds & Ahra Wu, 2015. "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 309-336, March.
    4. Renato Corbetta & Keith A. Grant, 2012. "Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 314-340, July.
    5. Christopher Marcoux & Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "Non-compliance by design: Moribund hard law in international institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 163-191, June.
    6. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
    7. Inken Borzyskowski & Felicity Vabulas, 2019. "Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 335-366, June.
    8. Lisa L. Martin, 1994. "4. Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 473-493, October.
    9. Frederick R. Chen, 2019. "Disentangling bias: national capabilities, regime type, and international conflict mediation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(2), pages 149-168, March.
    10. Peter Knaack & Saori N. Katada, 2013. "Fault Lines and Issue Linkages at the G20: New Challenges for Global Economic Governance," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 4(3), pages 236-246, September.
    11. Maamoun, Nada, 2021. "IEAs and compliance: Do treaty linkages play a role?," ILE Working Paper Series 43, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    12. Paul W. Thurner & Eric Linhart, 2004. "Political Multilevel Negotiations and Issue Linkage During an EU Intergovernmental Conference: An Empirical Application," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 243-266, November.
    13. Christina L. Davis & Tyler Pratt, 2021. "The forces of attraction: How security interests shape membership in economic institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 903-929, October.
    14. Gabriele Spilker & Tobias Böhmelt, 2013. "The impact of preferential trade agreements on governmental repression revisited," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 343-361, September.
    15. Molly M. Melin & Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, 2013. "Fear of rejection: The puzzle of unaccepted mediation offers in international conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(4), pages 354-368, September.
    16. Magnus Lundgren & Stefanie Bailer & Lisa M Dellmuth & Jonas Tallberg & Silvana Târlea, 2019. "Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 65-88, March.
    17. Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2016. "Communication and Conflict Management," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145634, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2018. "The long-run effects of communication as a conflict resolution mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 121-136.
    19. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Jana von Stein & Erik Gartzke, 2008. "International Organizations Count," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(2), pages 175-188, April.
    20. Olsen Tricia D. & Sinha Aseema, 2013. "Linkage politics and the persistence of national policy autonomy in emerging powers: patents, profits, and patients in the context of TRIPS compliance," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 323-356, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:30:y:2013:i:3:p:286-303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.