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Symmetry in Pay for Luck

Author

Listed:
  • Naveen D Daniel
  • Yuanzhi Li
  • Lalitha Naveen
  • Francesca Cornelli
Abstract
In this study, we take a comprehensive look at asymmetry in pay for luck, which is the finding that CEOs are rewarded for good luck, but are not penalized to the same extent for bad luck. Our main takeaway, which is based on over 200 different specifications, is that there is no asymmetry in pay for luck. Our finding is important given that the literature widely accepts the idea of asymmetry in pay for luck and typically points to this as evidence of rent extraction. (JEL G32, G34)Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Naveen D Daniel & Yuanzhi Li & Lalitha Naveen & Francesca Cornelli, 2020. "Symmetry in Pay for Luck," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(7), pages 3174-3204.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:7:p:3174-3204.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhz057
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Katharine D. Drake & Ellen Engel & Melissa A. Martin, 2023. "Investigating discretion in executive contracting: extracting private information from valuation allowance decisions," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 533-569, June.
    2. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    3. Reza, Syed Walid, 2020. "Profit skimming, asymmetric benchmarking, or the effects of implicit incentives? Evidence from natural disasters," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 57.
    4. Caleb Rawson, 2022. "Manager perception and proprietary investment disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 1493-1525, December.
    5. C.S. Agnes Cheng & Iftekhar Hasan & Feng Tang & Jing Xie, 2024. "Market Feedback Effect on CEO Pay: Evidence from Peers’ Say-on-Pay Voting Failures," Working Papers 202408, University of Macau, Faculty of Business Administration.
    6. Liu, Yun & Nanda, Vikram & Onal, Bunyamin & Silveri, Sabatino, 2021. "Employment mobility and pay for sector performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    7. Ben Angelo & Mitchell Johnston, 2023. "Technological innovation and stock returns: Innovative skill versus innovative luck," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 811-832, November.
    8. Mehtap A. Eklund, 2024. "CEO compensation and market risk: moderating effect of board size and CEO duality in the Swiss context," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(2), pages 227-240, June.
    9. Sungchang Kang & Jeongseok Bang & Doojin Ryu, 2024. "Female CEOs’ risk management and earnings performance during the financial crisis," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 110-138, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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