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An economic analysis of voting in Sweden

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  • Henrik Jordahl
Abstract
Using data from the Swedish Election Studies between 1985 and 1994 supplemented with time series on inflation and unemployment, I compare the impact of macro- and microeconomic variables on the individual vote. The principal finding is that macroeconomic variables influence the vote a bit more than microeconomic variables do. In consequence, both self-interest and public interest appear to be important explanations of economic voting in Sweden. Macroeconomic variables have, however, been much more influential in determining election outcomes. Since previous studies of economic voting have used cross-sectional data only, it is also worth noting that panel estimates indicate a much greater impact of macroeconomic variables on the individual vote than cross-sectional estimates do. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Henrik Jordahl, 2006. "An economic analysis of voting in Sweden," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 251-265, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:127:y:2006:i:3:p:251-265
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-0864-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Economou, Athina & Gavroglou, Stavros & Kollias, Christos, 2013. "Economic fluctuations and political self-placement," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 57-65.
    2. Simon Luechinger & Stephan Meier & Alois Stutzer, 2010. "Why Does Unemployment Hurt the Employed?: Evidence from the Life Satisfaction Gap Between the Public and the Private Sector," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 45(4), pages 998-1045.
    3. Mikael Elinder & Henrik Jordahl & Panu Poutvaara, 2008. "Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting," CESifo Working Paper Series 2489, CESifo.
    4. Mikael Elinder, 2012. "Correcting mistakes: cognitive dissonance and political attitudes in Sweden and the United States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 235-249, October.
    5. Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Dimitrios D. Thomakos, 2007. "Consumer Confidence and Elections," Working Paper series 42_07, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    6. Andrew J. Healy & Mikael Persson & Erik Snowberg, 2016. "Digging into the Pocketbook: Evidence on Economic Voting from Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 6171, CESifo.
    7. Robert Hodgson & John Maloney, 2010. "Economic Voting in Britain, 1857-1914," Discussion Papers 1009, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    8. Colombo, Emilio & Tirelli, Patrizio & Visser, Jelle, 2014. "Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 358-374.
    9. Jeffrey S. DeSimone & Courtney LaFountain, 2007. "Still the Economy, Stupid: Economic Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election," NBER Working Papers 13549, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Elinder, Mikael, 2010. "Local economies and general elections: The influence of municipal and regional economic conditions on voting in Sweden 1985-2002," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-292, June.
    11. Fredrik Carlsson & Olof Johansson‐Stenman, 2010. "Why Do You Vote and Vote as You Do?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 495-516, November.
    12. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CESifo Working Paper Series 6182, CESifo.
    13. Alex Luiz Ferreira & Sérgio Naruhiko Sakurai, 2013. "Personal charisma or the economy?: Macroeconomic indicators of presidential approval ratings in Brazil," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 14(3–4), pages 214-232.
    14. Fidrmuc, Jan & Doyle, Orla, 2003. "Anatomy of Voting Behaviour and Attitudes During Post-Communist Transition Czech Republic 1990-98," CEPR Discussion Papers 3801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Che-Yuan Liang, 2013. "Is there an incumbency advantage or cost of ruling in proportional election systems?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 259-284, March.
    16. Ronny Freier, 2011. "Incumbency as the Major Advantage: The Electoral Advantage for Parties of Incumbent Mayors," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1147, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    17. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2015. "Promises, policies and pocketbook voting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 177-194.
    18. Freier, Ronny, 2015. "The mayor's advantage: Causal evidence on incumbency effects in German mayoral elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 16-30.
    19. Elinder, Mikael, 2006. "Local Economies and General Elections," Working Paper Series 2007:1, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    20. John Maloney & Andrew Pickering, 2015. "Voting and the economic cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 119-133, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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