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Non-optimal unanimous agreement

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  • Randall Holcombe
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Suggested Citation

  • Randall Holcombe, 1986. "Non-optimal unanimous agreement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 229-244, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:48:y:1986:i:3:p:229-244
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00051620
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven Brams & John Heilman, 1974. "When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 11-25, March.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    4. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    5. Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1974. "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 505-518, June.
    6. Tullock, Gordon, 1982. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics-Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 824-826, August.
    7. Crain, W Mark, 1977. "On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(4), pages 829-842, August.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    9. Randall Holcombe & Asghar Zardkoohi, 1983. "On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 165-174, January.
    10. Butterworth, Robert Lyle, 1971. "A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 741-745, September.
    11. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dwight Lee, 1989. "Less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 83-87, July.
    2. Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 371-387, June.
    3. Randall Holcombe, 1989. "Non-optimal unanimous agreement under majority rule: Reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 89-92, July.

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