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Central Bank Communication and Disagreement about the Natural Rate Hypothesis

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  • Carola Conces Binder

    (Haverford College)

Abstract
About half of professional forecasters report that they use the natural rate of unemployment (u∗) to forecast. I show that forecasters' reported use of and estimates of u∗ are informative about their expectations-formation process, including their use of a Phillips curve. Those who report not using u∗ have higher and less anchored inflation expectations, and seem to have found the Federal Reserve's state-based forward guidance less credible. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) publishes participants' projections of longer-run unemployment in the Summary of Economic Projections. I document how and when the FOMC participants have disagreed with each other and with the private sector, discussing possible sources of disagreement and implications for credibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Central Bank Communication and Disagreement about the Natural Rate Hypothesis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(2), pages 81-123, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2021:q:2:a:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Arai, Natsuki, 2023. "The FOMC’s new individual economic projections and macroeconomic theories," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    2. Carola Conces Binder & Rodrigo Sekkel, 2024. "Central bank forecasting: A survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 342-364, April.
    3. Francesco Salsano, 2022. "Monetary policy when the objectives of central bankers are imperfectly observable," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 396-415, September.
    4. An, Zidong & Zheng, Xinye, 2023. "Diligent forecasters can make accurate predictions despite disagreeing with the consensus," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    5. Thomas L. Hogan, 2022. "The calculus of dissent: Bias and diversity in FOMC projections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 105-135, April.
    6. Philipp F. M. Baumann & Enzo Rossi & Alexander Volkmann, 2020. "What Drives Inflation and How: Evidence from Additive Mixed Models Selected by cAIC," Papers 2006.06274, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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