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Economic and Regulatory Capital in Banking: What Is the Difference?

Author

Listed:
  • Abel Elizalde

    (CEMFI and UPNA)

  • Rafael Repullo

    (CEMFI and CEPR)

Abstract
We analyze the determinants of regulatory capital (the minimum required by regulation), economic capital (that chosen by shareholders without regulation), and actual capital (that chosen with regulation) in a dynamic model of a bank with a loan-portfolio return described by the single-risk-factor model of Basel II. We show that variables that only affect economic capital, such as the intermediation margin and the cost of capital, can account for large deviations from regulatory capital. Actual capital is closer to regulatory capital, but the threat of closing undercapitalized banks generates significant capital buffers. Market discipline, proxied by the coverage of deposit insurance, increases economic and actual capital, although the effects are small.

Suggested Citation

  • Abel Elizalde & Rafael Repullo, 2007. "Economic and Regulatory Capital in Banking: What Is the Difference?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 87-117, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:3:a:3
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert N. McCauley & Steven A. Zimmer, 1990. "Bank cost of capital and international competition," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 15(Win), pages 33-59.
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    3. Repullo, Rafael, 2004. "Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 156-182, April.
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    5. Jackson, Patricia & Perraudin, William & Saporta, Victoria, 2002. "Regulatory and "economic" solvency standards for internationally active banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 953-976, May.
    6. Estrella, Arturo, 2004. "The cyclical behavior of optimal bank capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1469-1498, June.
    7. Gordy, Michael B., 2003. "A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 199-232, July.
    8. Aggarwal, Raj & Jacques, Kevin T., 2001. "The impact of FDICIA and prompt corrective action on bank capital and risk: Estimates using a simultaneous equations model," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1139-1160, June.
    9. Calem, Paul & Rob, Rafael, 1999. "The Impact of Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 317-352, October.
    10. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2004. "Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 496-521, October.
    11. Mark J. Flannery & Kasturi P. Rangan, 2008. "What Caused the Bank Capital Build-up of the 1990s?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(2), pages 391-429.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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