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The Single Mindedness Theory Micro-foundation and Application to Labor Market

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  • Emanuele Canegrati
Abstract
The central purpose of this paper is to introduce a new political economy approach which explains the characteristics of Social Security Systems. This approach is based on the Single Mindedness Theory, which assumes that the more single minded groups are able to exert a greater power of influence on Governments and eventually obtain what they ask. Governments are seen as voting-maximizer policy-makers, whose unique goal is winning elections. Using an OLG model and a probabilistic voting approach, I analyze a society divided into two groups, the old and the young, which only differ as for their preferences for leisure. I show that, to win elections, the Government sets the marginal tax rates taking into account the numerosity and the density of groups; eventually, the old receive a positive transfer, whose burden is entirely carried by the young. Furthermore, the more single minded group (the old) is taxed with higher tax rates; this result can be explained by the necessity that the group of the old have to find a way out to solve a free-riding problem among its members. Indeed, higher tax rates induce the old to retire earlier, so that retirees may have more time to participate in political activities and support the old group’s goals.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Canegrati, 2008. "The Single Mindedness Theory Micro-foundation and Application to Labor Market," Ekonomia journal, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, vol. 20.
    • Handle: RePEc:eko:ekoeko:20_6
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    File URL: http://ekonomia.wne.uw.edu.pl/ekonomia/getFile/657
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security," Economics Working Papers 383, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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    11. Feldstein, Martin, 2002. "The future of social security pensions in Europe," Journal of Financial Transformation, Capco Institute, vol. 5, pages 8-12.
    12. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories," Economics Working Papers 384, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    13. John Y. Campbell & Martin Feldstein, 2001. "Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number camp01-1.
    14. Mulligan, Casey B. & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1999. "Gerontocracy, Retirement, and Social Security," Working Papers 154, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Rocha de Sousa, 2010. "A single minded European representation? From illusion and delusion to reality of a European single seat," Economics Working Papers 2_2010, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).

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