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Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb

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  • Roemer, John E.
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  • Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:70:y:1998:i:3:p:399-424
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wittman, Donald, 1983. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 142-157, March.
    2. Louis Putterman, 1997. "Why Have the Rabble not Redistributed the Wealth? On the Stability of Democracy and Unequal Property," International Economic Association Series, in: John E. Roemer (ed.), Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare, chapter 13, pages 359-393, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. John E. Roemer, 1999. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 1-20, January.
    4. John E. Roemer, 1997. "Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 479-502.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    6. John E. Roemer (ed.), 1997. "Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-25287-9.
    7. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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