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Multicoalitional solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Gonzalez, Stéphane
  • Grabisch, Michel
Abstract
The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff vectors, multicoalitional solutions give in addition an allocation time to each coalition, which permits to realize the payoff vector. We give two instances of such solutions, called the d-multicoalitional core and the c-multicoalitional core, and both arise as the strong Nash equilibrium of two games, where in the first utility per active unit of time is maximized, while in the second it is the utility per total unit of time. We show that the d-core (or aspiration core) of Benett, and the c-core of Guesnerie and Oddou are strongly related to the d-multicoalitional and c-multicoalitional cores, respectively, and that the latter ones can be seen as an implementation of the former ones in a noncooperative framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalez, Stéphane & Grabisch, Michel, 2016. "Multicoalitional solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:64:y:2016:i:c:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.006
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    3. Ferreira, João J.M. & Jalali, Marjan S. & Ferreira, Fernando A.F., 2018. "Enhancing the decision-making virtuous cycle of ethical banking practices using the Choquet integral," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 492-497.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative game; Core; Aspiration core; Strong Nash implementation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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