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Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?

Author

Listed:
  • Neupane, Biwesh
  • Thapa, Chandra
  • Marshall, Andrew
  • Neupane, Suman
  • Shrestha, Chaman
Abstract
Exploiting the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as an exogenous shock that resulted in a significant decline in the ownership of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian equity market, we find evidence of a causal link between FIIs’ ownership and different dimensions of board monitoring. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that higher FIIs ownership leads to lower board size, busyness, network size, CEO power, CEO pay, and improved board diligence. However, we also document a negative link between FIIs’ ownership and board independence, indicating that FIIs do not view independent directors as effective monitors. In terms of implications, our results suggest that improved board monitoring, induced by higher FIIs’ ownership, leads to higher firm valuation and innovation activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Neupane, Biwesh & Thapa, Chandra & Marshall, Andrew & Neupane, Suman & Shrestha, Chaman, 2024. "Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s1042443124000283
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2024.101962
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    Keywords

    Board monitoring; Foreign institutional investors; Financial crisis; Firm value; Innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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