Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecofin/v47y2019icp48-64.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Insider trading, representativeness heuristic insider, and market regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Hong
  • Qi, Lina
  • Li, Zaili
Abstract
This article develops an insider-trading model with the presence of rational and representativeness heuristic insiders in the market with and without market regulation. We find that, regardless of whether the market regulation exist or not, the heuristic insider trades more aggressively on his information, than the rational insider does, with the result that there is a higher probability for him to earn greater profits. Further, a higher heuristic bias of the heuristic insider leads to lower expected profit for rational insider, but higher expected profits for the heuristic insider. Moreover, the heuristic insider and rational insider prefer to trade less aggressively on their information when there is market regulation, but, they are likely to get more ex-ante expected profit. Furthermore, we find that the price efficiency and market stability may all be sacrificed if insider trading is regulated.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Hong & Qi, Lina & Li, Zaili, 2019. "Insider trading, representativeness heuristic insider, and market regulation," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 48-64.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:47:y:2019:i:c:p:48-64
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2018.11.011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S106294081830216X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.najef.2018.11.011?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zhou, Deqing, 2011. "Overconfidence on public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 239-242, September.
    2. Fischer, Paul E. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1999. "Public information and heuristic trade," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 89-124, February.
    3. Barberis, Nicholas & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1998. "A model of investor sentiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 307-343, September.
    4. Shin, Jhinyoung, 1996. "The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 49-73, January.
    5. Luo, Shunlong, 2001. "The impact of public information on insider trading," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 59-68, January.
    6. Kyle, Albert S & Wang, F Albert, 1997. "Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2073-2090, December.
    7. Ormos, Mihály & Timotity, Dusán, 2016. "Market microstructure during financial crisis: Dynamics of informed and heuristic-driven trading," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 60-66.
    8. Chopra, Navin & Lakonishok, Josef & Ritter, Jay R., 1992. "Measuring abnormal performance : Do stocks overreact?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 235-268, April.
    9. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-270, March.
    10. Chowdhry, Bhagwan & Nanda, Vikram, 1991. "Multimarket Trading and Market Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(3), pages 483-511.
    11. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-738, August.
    12. Liu, Hong & Du, Sarina, 2016. "Can an overconfident insider coexist with a representativeness heuristic insider?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 170-177.
    13. Zhang, Wei David, 2008. "Impact of outsiders and disclosed insider trades," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 137-145, September.
    14. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    15. Ying Luo, Guo, 2013. "Can representativeness heuristic traders survive in a competitive securities market?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 152-164.
    16. Huddart, Steven & Hughes, John S & Levine, Carolyn B, 2001. "Public Disclosure and Dissimulation of Insider Trades," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 665-681, May.
    17. Liu, Hong & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2011. "Insider trading with public and shared information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1756-1762, July.
    18. Back, Kerry, 1992. "Insider Trading in Continuous Time," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 387-409.
    19. Nasser Arshadi & Thomas H. Eyssell, 1991. "Regulatory Deterrence and Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(2), Summer.
    20. Albert Wang, F., 1998. "Strategic trading, asymmetric information and heterogeneous prior beliefs," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 321-352, September.
    21. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1996. "Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1437-1478, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Boussaidi, Ramzi & AlSaggaf, Majid Ibrahim, 2022. "Contrarian profits and representativeness heuristic in the MENA stock markets," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Hong & Du, Sarina, 2016. "Can an overconfident insider coexist with a representativeness heuristic insider?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 170-177.
    2. Du, Sarina & Liu, Hong, 2015. "The overconfident trader does not always overreact to his information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 384-390.
    3. Jiang, Ying & Liu, Hong, 2022. "Insider trading, overconfidence, and private information flow," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Zhou, Deqing, 2015. "The virtue of overconfidence when you are not perfectly informed," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-110.
    5. Gong, Fuzhou & Liu, Hong, 2016. "Asymmetric information, heterogeneous prior beliefs, and public information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 100-120.
    6. Vayanos, Dimitri & Wang, Jiang, 2013. "Market Liquidity—Theory and Empirical Evidence ," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1289-1361, Elsevier.
    7. Zhou, Deqing, 2013. "Irrational confidence, imperfect and long-lived information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 383-405.
    8. Gong, Fuzhou & Liu, Hong, 2012. "Inside trading, public disclosure and imperfect competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 200-223.
    9. Dimitri Vayanos & Jiang Wang, 2012. "Market Liquidity -- Theory and Empirical Evidence," NBER Working Papers 18251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ying Luo, Guo, 2013. "Can representativeness heuristic traders survive in a competitive securities market?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 152-164.
    11. Zhou, Deqing & Wang, Wenjie, 2020. "Insider, outsider and information heterogeneity," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    12. Jiang, Ying & Liu, Hong & Yang, Qingshan, 2024. "Asymmetric information correlation in financial markets," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    13. Hirshleifer, David & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar & Titman, Sheridan, 2006. "Feedback and the success of irrational investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 311-338, August.
    14. David Hirshleifer, 2001. "Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(4), pages 1533-1597, August.
    15. Nguyen, Nhut H. & Truong, Cameron, 2013. "The information content of stock markets around the world: A cultural explanation," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-29.
    16. Wang, Kun Tracy & Wang, Wanbin Walter, 2017. "Competition in the stock market with asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 40-49.
    17. Katsumasa Nishide, 2009. "Insider trading with correlation between liquidity trading and a public signal," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 297-304.
    18. Liu, Hong & Chai, Shujuan, 2020. "Risk aversion, public disclosure, and partially informed outsiders," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    19. Hong Liu & Jingyuan Wu & Qingshan Yang, 2017. "Inside Trading when the Market Deviates from the Semi-strong Efficient Condition," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 18(1), pages 111-128, May.
    20. Bloomfield, Robert & Libby, Robert & Nelson, Mark W., 2000. "Underreactions, overreactions and moderated confidence," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 113-137, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rational insider; Representativeness heuristic insider; Market maker; Market regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:47:y:2019:i:c:p:48-64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620163 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.