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Cheap talk and coordination in the lab and in the field: Collective commercialization in Senegal

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  • Aflagah, Kodjo
  • Bernard, Tanguy
  • Viceisza, Angelino
Abstract
Most developing-country farms are small and engage in cooperative agriculture. Prior literature has argued that mechanisms aimed at facilitating smallholder coordination such as cooperatives are central to stimulating market participation. At the same time, cooperatives have not always been able to engage in collective action. In this paper, we conduct neutrally framed coordination games and a natural field experiment to test the effect of cheap talk among members of groundnut-producing cooperatives in Senegal. In both experiments, we ask farmers how much they intend to contribute to the group prior to them actually doing so and then, confidentially reveal aggregate intentions to other cooperative members. Based on survey and administrative data, we find that (1) revealing farmers’ intentions improves collective commercialization and this effect increases with group size and (2) learning in the lab transfers to behavior in the day-to-day environment. Implications for policy and future work are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Aflagah, Kodjo & Bernard, Tanguy & Viceisza, Angelino, 2022. "Cheap talk and coordination in the lab and in the field: Collective commercialization in Senegal," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:154:y:2022:i:c:s0304387821001164
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102751
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    4. Miller, Scott & Mullally, Conner, 2022. "Investigating the Inclusive-Performance Tradeoff in Agricultural Cooperatives: Evidence from Nepal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperatives; Collective commercialization; Coordination; Cheap talk; Field experiments; Development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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