Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v100y1990i403p1261-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold

Author

Listed:
  • Kotlikoff, Laurence J
  • Razin, Assaf
  • Rosenthal, Robert W
Abstract
This article demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence does not necessarily hold in models with altruistic transfers once one takes into account the strategic behavior of recipients as well as donors. To influence the final allocation of consumption in altruistic settings, potential recipients can threaten to refuse transfers. The authors apply the extended Nash bargaining solution to the problem of an altruistic parent and a possible altruistic child. They show that when the government redistributes between the parent and child, it changes their endowments and the equilibrium threats and, thus, the final allocation of consumption. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Razin, Assaf & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1261-1268, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:100:y:1990:i:403:p:1261-68
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199012%29100%3A403%3C1261%3AASAMIW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Burbidge, John B, 1983. "Government Debt in an Overlapping-Generations Model with Bequests and Gifts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 222-227, March.
    3. Kimball, Miles S., 1987. "Making sense of two-sided altruism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-326, September.
    4. Philippe Weil, 1987. "Love Thy Children," Post-Print hal-03393237, HAL.
    5. John Laitner, 1988. "Bequests, Gifts, and Social Security," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(2), pages 275-299.
    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    7. Abel, Andrew B, 1987. "Operative Gift and Bequest Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1037-1047, December.
    8. Carmichael, Jeffrey, 1982. "On Barro's Theorem of Debt Neutrality: The Irrelevance of Net Wealth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 202-213, March.
    9. Drazen, Allan, 1978. "Government Debt, Human Capital, and Bequests in a Life-Cycle Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(3), pages 505-516, June.
    10. Feldstein, Martin, 1988. "The Effects of Fiscal Policies when Incomes Are Uncertain: A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 14-23, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Salma Slimani, 2016. "Threshold Effects of Fiscal Policy on Economic Activity in Developing Countries," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 6(3), pages 20-37, March.
    2. Wolff, Francois-Charles & Laferrere, Anne, 2006. "Microeconomic models of family transfers," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 889-969, Elsevier.
    3. Yang-Ming Chang, 2012. "Strategic transfers, redistributive fiscal policies, and family bonds: a micro-economic analysis," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 1481-1502, October.
    4. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1121-1166, December.
    5. Rebelein, Robert P, 1998. "Ricardian Equivalence Survives Strategic Behavior," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 53(2), pages 195-228.
    6. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1992. "Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1177-1198, December.
    7. Genicot, Garance, 2016. "Two-sided altruism and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 92-97.
    8. Altig, David & Davis, Steven J., 1993. "Borrowing constraints and two-sided altruism with an application to social security," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 467-494, May.
    9. Slimani Salma & El Abbassi Idriss & Tounsi Said, 2016. "Threshold effects of fiscal policy on economic growth in developing countries," Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), LAR Center Press, vol. 4(3), pages 24-37, June.
    10. Dobrescu, Loretti I. & Kotlikoff, Laurence J. & Motta, Alberto, 2012. "Why aren't developed countries saving?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1261-1275.
    11. Salma Slimani, 2016. "Threshold Effects of Fiscal Policy on Economic Activity in Developing Countries," International Journal of Business and Social Research, LAR Center Press, vol. 6(3), pages 20-37, March.
    12. Kotlikoff, Laurence J., 2002. "Generational policy," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 27, pages 1873-1932, Elsevier.
    13. Soares, Jorge, 2015. "Borrowing constraints, parental altruism and welfare," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-20.
    14. Peter Prazmowski, 2014. "Ricardian equivalence and fiscal distortions in the Dominican Republic," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 109-125, February.
    15. Julian Jamison, 2012. "Games with Synergistic Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 3(1), pages 1-15, March.
    16. Eunji Kim & Yoonhee Ha & Sangheon Kim, 2017. "Public Debt, Corruption and Sustainable Economic Growth," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-30, March.
    17. Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Assessing Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 55-78, February.
    18. Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1995-2008, November.
    19. Robert P. Rebelein, 2006. "Strategic Behavior, Debt Neutrality, and Crowding Out," Public Finance Review, , vol. 34(2), pages 148-172, March.
    20. Zhang, Jie, 2006. "Second-best public debt with human capital externalities," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 347-360, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alice Schoonbroodt, 2010. "Who Owns Children and Does It Matter?," Working Papers id:2360, eSocialSciences.
    2. Becker, Torbjörn, 1995. "Government Debt and Private Consumption: Theory and Evidence," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 71, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. Miguel Angel Lopez Garcia, 1994. "On taxation in a model of intergenerational altruism," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 18(2), pages 381-389, May.
    4. Schoonbroodt, Alice & Tertilt, Michèle, 2014. "Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 551-582.
    5. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1987. "Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1987, Volume 2, pages 263-316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 1997. "When) is Consumption Taxation Equivalent to Wage Taxation ?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(1), pages 83-101, January.
    7. MICHEL, Philippe, 2003. "Public debt and limited altruism: is Ricardian equivalence possible if altruism is limited ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Michel, Philippe & Thibault, Emmanuel & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2006. "Intergenerational altruism and neoclassical growth models," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 1055-1106, Elsevier.
    9. Berthold U. Wigger, 2002. "Social Security and Growth in an Altruistic Economy," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 53-80, February.
    10. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1992. "Back to the future: monetary policy and the twin deficits," Working Papers 92-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    11. Jaime Alonso-Carrera & Jordi Caballé & Xavier Raurich, 2007. "Aspirations, Habit Formation, and Bequest Motive," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 813-836, April.
    12. Andrew B. Abel, "undated". "An Analysis of Fiscal Policy Under Operative and Inoperative Bequest Motives," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 10-87, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    13. Alonso-Carrera, Jaime & Caballé, Jordi & Raurich, Xavier, 2008. "Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1751-1764, July.
    14. Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Assessing Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 55-78, February.
    15. Lambrecht, Stephane & Michel, Philippe & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2005. "Public pensions and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1261-1281, July.
    16. Cardia, Emanuela & Michel, Philippe, 2004. "Altruism, intergenerational transfers of time and bequests," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(8), pages 1681-1701, June.
    17. Robinson, James A. & Srinivasan, T.N., 1993. "Long-term consequences of population growth: Technological change, natural resources, and the environment," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1175-1298, Elsevier.
    18. Jaime Alonso‐Carrera & Stéphane Bouché, 2024. "Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences and the Operativeness of Bequest Motive," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(4), pages 899-932, June.
    19. O'Connell, Stephen A. & Zeldes, Stephen P., 1993. "Dynamic efficiency in the gifts economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 363-379, June.
    20. Smetters, Kent, 1999. "Ricardian equivalence: long-run Leviathan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 395-421, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:100:y:1990:i:403:p:1261-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing or Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.