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When is an antitrust authority not aggressive enough in fighting cartels?

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  • Joseph E. Harrington, Jr
Abstract
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Suggested Citation

  • Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2011. "When is an antitrust authority not aggressive enough in fighting cartels?," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 39-50, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:7:y:2011:i:1:p:39-50
    DOI: j.1742-7363.2010.00148.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2010.00148.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. María C. Avramovich, 2020. "The Welfare Implications of the Meeting Design of a Cartel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 59-83, August.
    2. Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2015. "Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201602, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 13 Jan 2016.
    3. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Working Papers 1524, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. repec:tin:wpaper:20150141 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. S. Avdasheva & S. Golovanova & Y. Katsoulacos, 2019. "Optimal Institutional Structure of Competition Authorities Under Reputation Maximization: A Model and Empirical Evidence from the Case of Russia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 251-282, March.
    6. Peter L Ormosi, 2011. "A tip of the iceberg? The probability of catching cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-06, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Yannis Katsoulacos, 2019. "On the choice of legal standards: a positive theory for comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 125-165, October.

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