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Sex Selection and Gender Balance

Author

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  • V. Bhaskar
Abstract
We model the equilibrium sex ratio when parents can choose the sex of their child. With intrinsic son preference, sex selection results in a male-biased sex ratio. This is inefficient due to a marriage market congestion externality. Medical innovations that facilitate selection aggravate the inefficiency. If son preference arises endogenously, due to population growth causing an excess supply of women on the marriage market, selection may improve welfare. Empirically, sex selection causes an excess of males and reduces welfare in China. In most parts of India, cohort sizes are growing, implying an excess supply of women. (JEL J12, J13, J16, O15, P23)

Suggested Citation

  • V. Bhaskar, 2011. "Sex Selection and Gender Balance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 214-244, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:1:p:214-44
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.1.214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • P23 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population

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