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Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?

Author

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  • Chamon, Marcos
  • Schumacher, Julian
  • Trebesch, Christoph
Abstract
Governments often issue bonds in foreign jurisdictions, which can provide additional legal protection vis-á-vis domestic bonds. This paper studies the effect of this jurisdiction choice on bond prices. We test whether foreign-law bonds trade at a premium compared to domestic-law bonds. We use the euro area 2006-2013 as a unique testing ground, controlling for currency risk, liquidity risk, and term structure. Foreign-law bonds indeed carry significantly lower yields in distress periods, and this effect rises as the risk of a sovereign default increases. These results indicate that, in times of crisis, governments can borrow at lower rates under foreign law.

Suggested Citation

  • Chamon, Marcos & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2018. "Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 114, pages 164-179.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:232004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sovereign debt; creditor rights; seniority; law and finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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