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Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism

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  • Craig Volden
Abstract
Many policies in the United States are jointly determined by federal and state actions. In the game theoretic model offered here, politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods. In line with Peterson's (1995) theory of functional federalism, the level of government that is better able to supply particular goods and services tends to take the lead in their provision, even to the extent of fully crowding out much less efficient governments. However, under a broad set of circumstances, both state and national politicians seek credit via public spending, and their joint provision leads to a relative “oversupply” of public goods and services, and thus to “overtaxation.” Under joint provision, states vary in their responses to changing federal spending patterns based both on the causes of the national changes and on state characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Craig Volden, 2005. "Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(2), pages 327-342, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:327-342
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00126.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gianluigi Galeotti & Albert Breton, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Political Parties," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 47-65, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, 2008. "The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 840-857, October.
    2. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1011, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    3. William M. Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, 2012. "Rethinking Environmental Federalism In A Warming World," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(04), pages 1-33.
    4. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2014. "Party Cues In Elections Under Multilevel Governance: Theory And Evidence From Us States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1029-1058, August.
    5. Nelson, Hal T. & Rose, Adam & Wei, Dan & Peterson, Thomas & Wennberg, Jeffrey, 2015. "Intergovernmental climate change mitigation policies: theory and outcomes," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 97-136, April.
    6. Costa-Font, Joan & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada, 2017. "Can Regional Decentralisation Shift Health Care Preferences?," IZA Discussion Papers 11180, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "A political agency model of coattail voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
    8. Costa-Font, Joan & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada, 2022. "Does devolution influence the choice and quality of public (vs private) health care?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 632-653.
    9. Luke Fowler & Chris Birdsall, 0. "Does the Primacy System Work? State versus Federal Implementation of the Clean Water Act," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 131-160.
    10. Stephanie Zarb & Kristin Taylor, 2023. "Uneven local implementation of federal policy after disaster: Policy conflict and goal ambiguity," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 40(1), pages 63-87, January.
    11. Weingast, Barry R., 2014. "Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 14-25.
    12. Monica Hubbard & Luke Fowler, 2021. "Institutional Collective Action on Drugs: Functional and Vertical Dilemmas of Unused Pharmaceuticals," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 38(1), pages 76-96, January.
    13. Joan Costa-Font & Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2019. "Regional Decentralisation and the Demand for Public Health Care," Studies on the Spanish Economy eee2019-41, FEDEA.
    14. Busemeyer, Marius R., 2007. "The Impact of Fiscal Decentralisation on Education and Other Types of Spending," MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    15. Jerzak, Connor T. & Libgober, Brian, 2020. "The impact of a transportation intervention on electoral politics: Evidence from E-ZPass," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    16. Mounah Abdel-Samad & Jerel P. Calzo & Jennifer K. Felner & Lianne Urada & Matthew E. Verbyla & Hala Madanat & Brian E. Adams & Thais Alves & Bruce Appleyard & Joshua Chanin & Shawn Flanigan & Hisham F, 2021. "Conceptualizing an Interdisciplinary Collective Impact Approach to Examine and Intervene in the Chronic Cycle of Homelessness," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(4), pages 1-17, February.

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