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Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

Author

Listed:
  • Bender, Klaus
  • Richter, Andreas
Abstract
Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit der geeigneten Ausgestaltung von Risikoteilungsregeln in der Rückversicherung bei asymmetrischer Information hinsichtlich des Verhaltens des Erstversicherers. Letzterer hat üblicherweise massive unbeobachtbare Spielräume z.B. bei der Auswahl der von ihm versicherten Risiken, so dass ein typisches Problem moralischen Risikos entsteht. Es wird hier gezeigt, dass die Existenz von moralischem Risiko entscheidende Auswirkungen auf die Eigenschaften des im Rückversicherungsvertrag zu spezifizierenden Zusammenhangs zwischen Schaden und Entschädigung, der so genannten Rückversicherungsform, besitzt. Insbesondere stellt sich heraus, dass bei unbeobachtbarem Einfluss des Erstversicherers auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung des Umfangs möglicher Ansprüche eine Pareto-optimale Entschädigungsfunktion an jeder Stelle flacher verläuft als bei vollständiger Information. Der Erstversicherer wird also an jeder marginalen Erhöhung des Schadens stärker beteiligt. Eine betragsmäßig fixierte Selbstbeteiligung in der Form einer so genannten Abzugsfranchise, die in der Literatur häufig als Lösungsansatz vorgeschlagen wird, erweist sich hingegen in diesem Zusammenhang nicht als geeignetes Instrument.

Suggested Citation

  • Bender, Klaus & Richter, Andreas, 2002. "Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 9, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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