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Legislative Cycles in Semipresidential Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas GAVOILLE

    (Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, Latvia - Condorcet Center, University Rennes 1, France)

  • Fabio PADOVANO

    (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University Rennes 1, France - Department of Political Sciences, University Roma Tre, Italy)

Abstract
The Political Legislation Cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator focuses on voters’ welfare to be reelected. This paper tests the theory on the French semipresidential system, characterized by direct election of both the executive and the legislature. We use a dataset that encompasses all the approved voted legis-lation in France from 1959 to 2012 at a monthly rate, and find a dual cycle of the production of laws, connected to both the presidential and the legislative elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas GAVOILLE & Fabio PADOVANO, 2016. "Legislative Cycles in Semipresidential Systems," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2016-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2016-01-ccr
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    File URL: https://ged.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/esupversions/bda32811-e3c0-44a5-a72f-19e6b62d9cba
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    Cited by:

    1. Lagona, Francesco & Padovano, Fabio, 2021. "How does legislative behavior change when the country becomes democratic? The case of South Korea," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Zoltán Fazekas & Martin Ejnar Hansen, 2022. "Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2015," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 51-73, April.
    3. Mamadou Boukari & Etienne Farvaque & Daniel Cakpo-Tozo, 2019. "“Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!†Popularity Gains as an Incentive to Legislate Frantically?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 1488-1507.
    4. Gavoille, Nicolas, 2018. "Who are the ‘ghost’ MPs? Evidence from the French parliament," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 134-148.
    5. Gavoille, Nicolas & Verschelde, Marijn, 2017. "Electoral competition and political selection: An analysis of the activity of French deputies, 1958–2012," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 180-195.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Legislation Cycle - Legislative production - Economic theory of legislation -Semipresidential government system - Hierarchical Poisson regression;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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