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International Environmental Agreements with Support

Author

Listed:
  • Erik Ansink

    (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    (Wageningen University)

  • Cees Withagen

    (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

Abstract
We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard & Cees Withagen, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements with Support," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-015/VIII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Jul 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Achim Hagen & Klaus Eisenack, 2019. "Climate Clubs Versus Single Coalitions: The Ambition Of International Environmental Agreements," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 1-19, August.
    2. Stelios Rozakis & Athanasios Kampas, 2022. "An interactive multi-criteria approach to admit new members in international environmental agreements," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 3461-3487, September.
    3. Achim Hagen & Pierre von Mouche & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2020. "The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, January.
    4. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2022. "International Environmental Agreements When Countries Behave Morally," CESifo Working Paper Series 10090, CESifo.
    5. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2018. "Common pool resources: Is there support for conservationists?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-083/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Matteo Roggero & Leonhard Kähler & Achim Hagen, 2019. "Strategic cooperation for transnational adaptation: lessons from the economics of climate change mitigation," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 395-410, October.
    7. Gavard, Claire & Schoch, Niklas, 2021. "Climate finance and emission reductions: What do the last twenty years tell us?," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-014, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Hans-Peter Weikard, 2019. "Policy Note: "Towards an International Treaty to Fight Plastic Pollution in Water Systems: Some Tasks for Economists"," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-7, January.
    9. Li, Liming & Chen, Weidong, 2021. "The impact of subsidies in a transboundary pollution game with myopic players," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalition formation; Public goods; Support; Transfers; International Environmental Agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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