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Economic Integration and Labor Market Institutions: Worker Mobility, Earnings Risk, and Contract Structure

Author

Listed:
  • Ronnie Schoeb

    (University of Munich)

  • David E. Wildasin

    (University of Kentucky)

Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of labor market integration, in the form of worker mobility, in a model with long-term labor contracts that lead to wage rigidities and unemployment. Increased mobility leads to more flexible labor market institutions in which firms can more easily vary the level of employment in response to fluctuations in demand. Economic integration is potentially Pareto-improving but, in the absence of a system of compensation, workers are harmed by greater labor mobility while the owners of firms benefit from higher profits.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronnie Schoeb & David E. Wildasin, 2001. "Economic Integration and Labor Market Institutions: Worker Mobility, Earnings Risk, and Contract Structure," Labor and Demography 0112002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0112002
    Note: Type of Document - ; prepared on TeX; figures: request from author
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Factor mobility and fiscal policy in the EU: policy issues and analytical approaches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 338-378.
    2. Picard, Pierre M. & Wildasin, David E., 2011. "Outsourcing, labor market pooling, and labor contracts," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 47-60, July.
    3. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1999. "Inflation and Welfare: Comment on Robert Lucas," NBER Working Papers 6979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Picard, Pierre M. & Wildasin, David, 2009. "Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 4357, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Poutvaara, Panu, 1999. "Federation's alternative tax constitutions and risky education," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-42, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Jonas Agell, 2001. "Warum haben wir rigide Arbeitsmärkte? Rent‐seeking versus Soziale Sicherung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(4), pages 363-381, November.
    7. Agell Jonas, 2002. "On the Determinants of Labour Market Institutions: Rent Seeking vs. Social Insurance," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 107-135, May.
    8. He, Weijun & Wang, Bo & Danish, & Wang, Zhaohua, 2018. "Will regional economic integration influence carbon dioxide marginal abatement costs? Evidence from Chinese panel data," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 263-274.
    9. Zhiying Ji & Yuting Huang, 2023. "The Impact of Highway Infrastructure on Population Mobility: Evidence from a Sample of 800 Counties and Districts (2000–2019) in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(20), pages 1-17, October.
    10. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & Michael P. Devereux & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Xavier Vives, 2008. "Chapter 3: The effect of globalisation on Western European jobs: curse or blessing?," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo, vol. 0, pages 71-104, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    labor mobility economic integration unemployment implicit contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • J - Labor and Demographic Economics

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