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Testing, Teacher Turnover and the Distribution of Teachers Across Grades and Schools

Author

Listed:
  • Fuchsman, Dillon

    (Sinquefield Center for Applied Economic Research, Saint Louis University)

  • Sass, Tim

    (Georgia State University)

  • Zamarro, Gema

    (University of Arkansas)

Abstract
Teacher turnover has adverse consequences for student achievement and imposes large financial costs for schools. Some have argued that high-stakes testing may lower teachers’ satisfaction with their jobs and could be a major contributor to teacher attrition. In this paper, we exploit changes in the tested grades and subjects in Georgia to study the effects of eliminating high-stakes testing on teacher turnover and the distribution of teachers across grades and schools. To measure the effect of testing pressures on teacher mobility choices we use a "difference-in-differences" approach, comparing changes in mobility over time in grades/subjects that discontinue testing vis-à-vis grades/subjects that are always tested. Our results show that eliminating testing did not have an impact on the likelihood of leaving teaching, changing schools within a district, or moving between districts. We only uncover small negative effects on the likelihood of grade switching. However, we do find relevant positive effects on retention of beginning teachers in the profession. In particular, the average probability of exit for teachers with 0-4 years of experience fell from 14 to 13 percentage points for teachers in grades 1 and 2 and from 14 to 11 percentage points in grades 6 and 7.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuchsman, Dillon & Sass, Tim & Zamarro, Gema, 2020. "Testing, Teacher Turnover and the Distribution of Teachers Across Grades and Schools," Working Papers 20-1, Sinquefield Center for Applied Economic Research, Saint Louis University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:sluecr:2020_001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sarah C. Fuller & Helen F. Ladd, 2013. "School-Based Accountability and the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Grades in Elementary School," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 528-559, October.
    2. Feng, Li & Figlio, David & Sass, Tim, 2018. "School accountability and teacher mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-17.
    3. Charles T. Clotfelter & Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor & Roger Aliaga Diaz, 2004. "Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low-performing schools to attract and retain high-quality teachers?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 251-271.
    4. Li Feng & Tim R. Sass, 2017. "Teacher Quality and Teacher Mobility," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 12(3), pages 396-418, Summer.
    5. Rebecca Dizon-Ross, 2018. "How Does School Accountability Affect Teachers? Evidence from New York City," NBER Working Papers 24658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    teacher turnover; high-stakes testing; accountability pressure difference-in-differences approach;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

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