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The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions

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  • Athias, Laure
  • Nunez, Antonio
Abstract
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of renegotiation affects the winner’s curse effect. Using a unique dataset of 49 concessions, we show that the winner’s curse effect is particularly strong, i.e. bidders bid less aggressively when they expect more competition. In addition, we observe that this effect is larger for projects where the common uncertainty is greater, and is dampened in weaker institutional frameworks, in which renegotiations are easier.

Suggested Citation

  • Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008. "The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions," MPRA Paper 10539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10539
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17086/1/MPRA_paper_17086.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Engel, Eduardo M.R:A. & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 2019. "Soft budgets and endogenous renegotiations in transport PPPs: An equilibrium analysis," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 40-50.
    3. Reza Farrahi Moghaddam & Fereydoun Farrahi Moghaddam & Mohamed Cheriet, 2014. "A Multi-Entity Input Output (MEIO) Approach to Sustainability - Water-Energy-GHG (WEG) Footprint Statements in Use Cases from Auto and Telco Industries," Papers 1404.6227, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2014.
    4. Mathisen, Terje Andreas, 2016. "Competitive tendering and cross-shareholding in public passenger transport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 45-48.
    5. Gino Loyola, 2021. "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1527-1567, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Winner’s curse; Common value auction; Public Private Partnerships; incomplete contract;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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