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Sudden Termination Auctions – An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Sascha Füllbrunn

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

  • Abdolkarim Sadrieh

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract
The design of markets has become a major issue due to the capability of online operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. The second price candle auction which is technically demanding and rarely implemented offline proves to be a faster and equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Sascha Füllbrunn & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Sudden Termination Auctions – An Experimental Study," FEMM Working Papers 06024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:06024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. DavidJ. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2008. "Understanding Overbidding In Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1572-1595, October.
    2. Jennifer Brown & John Morgan, 2009. "How Much Is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(4), pages 668-700, August.
    3. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
    4. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. "The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
    5. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "Bidding with Outside Options," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    6. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
    7. Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006. "Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
    8. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
    9. Morgan John & Steiglitz Ken & Reis George, 2003. "The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, April.
    10. Daniel Houser & John Wooders, 2005. "Hard and Soft Closes: A Field Experiment on Auction Closing Rules," Springer Books, in: Amnon Rapoport & Rami Zwick (ed.), Experimental Business Research, chapter 0, pages 123-131, Springer.
    11. Aseff, Jorge G., 2004. "Learning to play second-price auctions, an experimental study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 279-286, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhuohan Wang & Dong Hao, 2022. "Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, November.
    2. Sascha Füllbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2020. "Underpricing of initial public offerings in experimental asset markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1002-1029, December.
    3. Sascha Füllbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer, 2007. "An experimental investigation of collusion in hard-close auctions: partners and friends," FEMM Working Papers 07024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    4. Sascha Füllbrunn, 2007. "Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions," FEMM Working Papers 07025, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions; termination rules; electronic markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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