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Predation And Network Based Price Discrimination In Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Claudio A. Agostini

    (School of Government, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez)

  • Raúl Lazcano

    (Ministry of Transports and Telecommunication, Chile)

  • Eduardo H. Saavedra

    (ILADES – Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

  • C. Manuel Willington

    (School of Government, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez)

Abstract
This paper uses a model of strategic interaction among firms –that set discriminatory and nonlinear prices– together with public information on prices of the plans marketed by the three major mobile phone companies, to assess the extent to which on-net and offnet price differentials in the plans they offer could represent predatory practices in the mobile telephony market in Chile. The results show that these companies offered plans that could present evidence of predatory practices. Despite the fact that these plans were a small fraction of all the plans mobile phone firms offered they were recently banned by the antitrust authority as they represented a relevant fraction of all traffic.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio A. Agostini & Raúl Lazcano & Eduardo H. Saavedra & C. Manuel Willington, 2016. "Predation And Network Based Price Discrimination In Chile," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv314, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv314
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Son, Pham Hai & Son, Le Hoang & Jha, Sudan & Kumar, Raghvendra & Chatterjee, Jyotir Moy, 2019. "Governing mobile Virtual Network Operators in developing countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 169-180.
    2. Clavijo, R, 2022. "Price discrimination under nonuniform calling circles and call externalities," Documentos de Trabajo 20054, Universidad del Rosario.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Telecommunication network competition; on-net/off-net price discrimination; call externality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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