Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/ipppap/halshs-02516424.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Outlook on the Kidney Paired Donation Program in France

Author

Listed:
  • Julien Combe

    (UCL - University College of London [London])

  • Victor Hiller

    (LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas)

  • Olivier Tercieux

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques)

  • Benoît Audry

    (Agence de la biomédecine [Saint-Denis la Plaine])

  • Yinghua He

    (Rice University [Houston])

  • Christian Jacquelinet

    (Agence de la biomédecine [Saint-Denis la Plaine], IPP - Institut des politiques publiques)

  • Marie-Alice Macher

    (Agence de la biomédecine [Saint-Denis la Plaine], INSERM U1018, Faculté de Médecine Paris Sud - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale)

Abstract
Many countries, including France, have seen a sharp increase in the number of renal disease patients waiting for a transplant. The shortage of kidney transplants has led some countries to develop "paired donation" programmes, which allow patients who can only find incompatible living donors to "swap" donors in order to receive a compatible transplant. In France, the number of additional transplants obtained through this programme is very limited, due in large part to the strict legal framework governing paired donations. For example, the law stipulates that an exchange can only take place between two patient / donor pairs. In its June 2018 summary report, the French National Consultative Ethics Committee (CCNE) lays out avenues to reform the paired donation programme. The French government is expected to present a draft law on revision of the bioethics law in the coming months. It therefore struck us as important to assess the potential effect on transplant numbers if the law were changed to authorise more exible practices in the paired donation programme. On the face of things, increasing the number of patient / donor pairs allowed to take part in an exchange seems like a good way of generating more transplants, but we show that this measure has only a modest impact. A different approach, which has proven effective in other countries, is to allow "donation chains". We show that allowing donation chains that begin with deceased donors, even at modest frequency, can more than triple the number of transplants.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Combe & Victor Hiller & Olivier Tercieux & Benoît Audry & Yinghua He & Christian Jacquelinet & Marie-Alice Macher, 2019. "Outlook on the Kidney Paired Donation Program in France," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-02516424, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:ipppap:halshs-02516424
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02516424v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02516424v1/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kratz, Jörgen, 2024. "Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:ipppap:halshs-02516424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Caroline Bauer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.