Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/dij/wpfarg/1001201.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Shareholders' activism. A comparison between the United Kingdom and France

Author

Listed:
  • Girard, Carine
Abstract
This paper provides new insights into the strategic alignment of specific minority dissident coalitions who influence or try to influence the decisionmaking process. With the corporate governance literature and a descriptive approach based on two samples : 79 French quoted companies from 1989 to 2000 and 57 British listed companies from 1992 to 2000, we try to identify the characteristics of the French and the British shareholders' activism. This activism is a contest process composed by influence activities, such as lobbying activities, proxy contests or judicial activities and initiated by non controlling shareholders, such as institutional or individual investors and shareholders' association. The study of the identity of dissident shareholders, the forms of activism and the activism's objectives depending on investment policy permit us to compare, two new models, French and British activism to the American model examined by the corporate governance theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Girard, Carine, 2000. "Shareholders' activism. A comparison between the United Kingdom and France," Working Papers CREGO 1001201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1001201
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://crego.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/wp/1001201.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Strickland, Deon & Wiles, Kenneth W. & Zenner, Marc, 1996. "A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 319-338, February.
    2. Gordon, Lilli A & Pound, John, 1993. "Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 697-718, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Shackell, Margaret B., 2001. "An Empirical Analysis of the SEC's 1992 Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation," Research Papers 1679, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, 2002. "Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-09, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 365-395, November.
    4. Abe Jong & Gerard Mertens & Peter Roosenboom, 2006. "Shareholders’ Voting at General Meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(4), pages 353-380, November.
    5. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process," Other publications TiSEM cc25d736-2965-4511-b100-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Wang, Qiong & Qiu, Muqing, 2023. "Strength in numbers: Minority shareholders' participation and executives' pay-performance sensitivity," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. Viju Raghupathi & Jie Ren & Wullianallur Raghupathi, 2020. "Identifying Corporate Sustainability Issues by Analyzing Shareholder Resolutions: A Machine-Learning Text Analytics Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-24, June.
    9. Jaspreet Kaur & Madhu Vij & Ajay Kumar Chauhan, 2023. "Signals influencing corporate credit ratings—a systematic literature review," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 50(1), pages 91-114, March.
    10. Noura Ben M’Barek, 2008. "L’hétérogénéité du comportement de contrôle des investisseurs institutionnels français," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 91(1), pages 231-254.
    11. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis & Collins, Daniel W. & LaFond, Ryan, 2006. "The effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 203-243, October.
    12. Yeh, Tsung-ming, 2017. "Determinants and consequences of shareholder proposals: The cases of board election, charter amendment, and profit disposal," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 245-261.
    13. Erin E. Smith, 2019. "Are Antitakeover Amendments Good for Shareholders? Evidence from the Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions in the Post-SOX Era," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(04), pages 1-40, December.
    14. Siala Bouaziz Souha & Jarboui Anis & David McMillan, 2016. "Corporate governance and firm characteristics as explanatory factors of shareholder activism: Validation through the French context," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 1150407-115, December.
    15. Taruntej Singh Arora, 2020. "Impact of Corporate Governance on Credit Ratings: An Empirical Study in the Indian Context," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 13(2), pages 140-164, December.
    16. Jang-Sup Shin, 2018. "The Subversion of Shareholder Democracy and the Rise of Hedge-Fund Activism," Working Papers Series 77, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    17. Janet Lee & Greg Shailer, 2008. "The Effect of Board-Related Reforms on Investors' Confidence," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 18(2), pages 123-134, June.
    18. M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, 2003. "The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 1-24, February.
    19. Morgan, Angela & Poulsen, Annette & Wolf, Jack, 2006. "The evolution of shareholder voting for executive compensation schemes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 715-737, September.
    20. Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1001201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Angèle RENAUD (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.