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Time Consistent Pareto Solutions in Common Access Resource Games with Asymmetric Players

Author

Listed:
  • Albert de-Paz
  • Jesus Marin-Solano
  • Jorge Navas

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract
In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert de-Paz & Jesus Marin-Solano & Jorge Navas, 2011. "Time Consistent Pareto Solutions in Common Access Resource Games with Asymmetric Players," Working Papers in Economics 253, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2011253
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Zeeuw, A.J., 2008. "Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements," Other publications TiSEM 41f27f71-d6e6-463e-9b03-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. de Zeeuw, Aart, 2008. "Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 163-174, March.
    3. Marín-Solano, Jesús & Navas, Jorge, 2009. "Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: The free terminal time case," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 666-675, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. José Daniel López-Barrientos & Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova & Ekaterina Sergeevna Miroshnichenko, 2020. "Resource Exploitation in a Stochastic Horizon under Two Parametric Interpretations," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-29, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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