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Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat

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Abstract
We investigate the possibility for governance authorities to avoid a large part of regulatory costs, by simply backing up social norms with a threat of collective punishment. Specifically, we consider the case of fisheries in which the regulatory cap is to sustain an optimal conservation level. We identify a mandatory regulation such that, when it is used as a threat, it ensures that the cap is voluntarily implemented. The mandatory scheme is based on a incentive mechanism which secures the returns of the harvester, and a tax on potential capacity. From the status of mere threat, this mandatory regulation takes time to be enforced though. We show that such a tax scheme, even if it is applied randomly after the first occurrence of a deviation from the optimal conservation level, ensures voluntary compliance, provided a suitable choice of the capacity tax. We study the properties of this tax scheme and build an example using data on the scallop fishery in the Saint-Brieuc Bay (France) to illustrate our point.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne-Sarah Chiambretto & Hubert Stahn, 2017. "Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat," AMSE Working Papers 1712, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1712
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    1. Elkhan Richard Sadik-Zada & Mattia Ferrari & Alicia Gonzalez & Laman Yusubova, 2023. "Could Deep-Sea Fisheries Contribute to the Food Security of Our Planet? Pros and Cons," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(20), pages 1-12, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voluntary agreements; fisheries; conservation policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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