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A behavioral power index

Author

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  • Kaniovski, Serguei
  • Leech, Dennia
Abstract
We propose an empirically informed measure of the voting power that relaxes the assumptions of equally probable and independent votes. The behavioral power index measures the voter’s ability to swing a decision based on the probability distributions of the others’ behavior. We apply it to the Supreme Court of the United States using roll-call data to estimate voting probability distributions, which lead us to refute the assumption of equally probable and independent votes, and estimate the equivalent number of independent Justices for the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist benches, which turns out to be very low.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaniovski, Serguei & Leech, Dennia, 2009. "A behavioral power index," Economic Research Papers 269780, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269780
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
    2. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 331-338, July.
    3. Pradeep Dubey & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1979. "Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 99-131, May.
    4. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2005. "The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(3), pages 377-387, July.
    5. Heard, Andrew & Swartz, Tim, 1998. "Empirical Banzhaf Indices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 701-707, December.
    6. Newcombe, Hanna & Ross, Michael & Newcombe, Alan G., 1970. "United Nations Voting Patterns," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(01), pages 100-121, December.
    7. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 517-538, October.
    8. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 291-308, July.
    9. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "A Priori Voting Power: What Is It All About?," Political Studies Review, Political Studies Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, January.
    10. Fiona Hayes‐Renshaw & Wim Van Aken & Helen Wallace, 2006. "When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 161-194, March.
    11. Bernard Steunenberg & Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt, 1999. "Strategic Power in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 339-366, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    2. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 2013. "Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 1-18, June.
    3. László Á. Kóczy, 2016. "Power Indices When Players can Commit to Reject Coalitions," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-91, August.
    4. Steven Brams & Gustavo Camilo & Alexandra Franz, 2014. "Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 525-539, March.
    5. Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.
    6. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2019. "Are World Leaders Loss Averse?," CESifo Working Paper Series 7763, CESifo.

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