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The Role of Strategic Uncertainty in Area-wide Pest Management Decisions of Florida Citrus Growers

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  • Singerman, Ariel
  • Useche, Pilar
Abstract
We conducted a choice experiment based on the theory of global games to analyze the impact of strategic uncertainty on participation decisions of Florida citrus growers in area-wide pest management programs to control the vector of citrus greening. We found that the farmers average certainty equivalent in a strategically uncertain setting under a high coordination requirement for obtaining a Pareto superior payoff, was lower compared to that of a lottery. Moreover, we found some evidence that the perceived risk of farmers in the strategically uncertain alternative increased as the size of the group increased. Thus, our results help explain why, despite the efficiency of area-wide pest management to control the vector of citrus greening across Florida, farmers participation is not as widespread as one would expect. To avoid the strategic uncertainty involved in relying on neighbors, many farmers choose self-reliance in spraying despite the lower payoff. As a recommendation for policy makers, we propose a top-down regulation so as to generate a bottom-up collective action to deal with the issue of strategic uncertainty in area-wide pest management to avoid the sub-optimal outcome. Acknowledgement :
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Singerman, Ariel & Useche, Pilar, 2018. "The Role of Strategic Uncertainty in Area-wide Pest Management Decisions of Florida Citrus Growers," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274039, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea18:274039
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274039
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    Cited by:

    1. Sergio H. Lence & Ariel Singerman, 2023. "When does voluntary coordination work? Evidence from area‐wide pest management," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(1), pages 243-264, January.
    2. Brandon R. McFadden & Brittany N. Anderton & Kelly A. Davidson & John C. Bernard, 2021. "The effect of scientific information and narrative on preferences for possible gene‐edited solutions for citrus greening," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 1595-1620, December.
    3. Hasibuan, Abdul Muis & Gregg, Daniel & Stringer, Randy, 2022. "Risk preferences, intra-household dynamics and spatial effects on chemical inputs use: Case of small-scale citrus farmers in Indonesia," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    4. J. Nicolas Hernandez-Aguilera & Max Mauerman & Alexandra Herrera & Kathryn Vasilaky & Walter Baethgen & Ana Maria Loboguerrero & Rahel Diro & Yohana Tesfamariam Tekeste & Daniel Osgood, 2020. "Games and Fieldwork in Agriculture: A Systematic Review of the 21st Century in Economics and Social Science," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-22, October.
    5. Drechsler, Martin, 2023. "A game-theoretic systematic of interactions and dynamics in the conservation and management of spatial ecosystem services," MPRA Paper 117605, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    Keywords

    Experimental Economics; Behavioral & Institutional Economics; Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis;
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