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The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self- Governance in Teams

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit Ramalingam

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Brock V. Stoddard

    (Appalachian State University)

  • James M. Walker

    (Indiana University)

Abstract
In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’, and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attracting the ‘loyalties’ of team members. By eschewing the study of additional mechanisms that require external intervention or alterations of payoff functions, our work highlights the potential of implicit competition in promoting cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard & James M. Walker, 2018. "The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self- Governance in Teams," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2018_011, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
    • Handle: RePEc:cth:wpaper:gru_2018_011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Takeuchi, Ai & Seki, Erika, 2023. "Coordination and free-riding problems in the provision of multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 95-121.
    2. Abhijit Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard & James M. Walker, 2021. "Naturally occurring enhancements to competition for talent in teams​," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2021_021, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
    3. Abhijit Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard & James M. Walker, 2020. "Naturally occurring enhancements to competition for talent in teams," Working Papers 21-02, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public goods; experiment; divided loyalties; competition; resources; endogenous membership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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