Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cre/crefwp/57.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Entrepreneurship, Asymmetric Information and Unemployment

Author

Listed:
Abstract
We examine how three sources of asymmetric information affect the supply of entrepreneurs and unemployment. In the first case, banks cannot observe entrepreneurs' risk of failure so ration credit. This increases the number of entrepreneurs and the level of unemployment. In the second case, firms cannot observe workers' effort so offer a wage above the market clearing one. This results in unemployment and too few entrepreneurs. The final case arises when firms cannot observe workers' abilities. A pooling wage is offered and results in too many entrepreneurs. The role of government in restoring efficiency is explored Dans ce texte, nous étudions l'impact de trois formes d'asymétrie d'information sur l'entrepreneurship et le chômage. Dans le premier cas, les banques ne peuvent observer la probabilité qu'un entrepreneur fasse faillite, ce qui les conduit à restreindre l'accès au crédit. Cela cause un accroissement du nombre d'entrepreneurs et du chômage. Dans un deuxième cas, les firmes ne peuvent observer l'effort de leurs travailleurs et offrent alors un salaire d'efficience. D'un tel salaire résulte du chômage et un trop petit nombre d'entrepreneurs. Dans le dernier cas, les firmes ne peuvent observer l'habileté de leurs travailleurs. Un même salaire est alors offert à tous les travailleurs, ce qui conduit à un trop grand npmbre d'entrepreneurs. Nous étudions les formes d'intervention gouvernementale permettant d'accroître l'efficacité.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Maurice Marchand & Marianne Vigneault, 1998. "Entrepreneurship, Asymmetric Information and Unemployment," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 57, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
    • Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:57
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/CREFE/cahiers/cah57.ps
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/CREFE/cahiers/cah57.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
    2. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1991. "Optimal linear income taxation in models with occupational choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 133-162, November.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 1994. "Growth and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 477-494.
    4. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 719-748, August.
    5. Marc Cowling & Mark Taylor & Peter Mitchell, 2004. "Job Creators," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 72(5), pages 601-617, September.
    6. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1991. "Optimal linear income taxation in models with occupational choice," LIDAM Reprints CORE 958, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    8. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1991. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 3588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ilmakunnas Pekka & Kanniainen Vesa, 2001. "Entrepreneurship, Economic Risks, and Risk Insurance in the Welfare State: Results with OECD Data 1978±93," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 195-218, August.
    2. Oana Secrieru & Marianne Vigneault, 2004. "Public Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship," Staff Working Papers 04-10, Bank of Canada.
    3. Mikko Leppämäki & Vesa Kanniainen, 2000. "Entrepreneurship in a Unionised Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 379, CESifo.
    4. Kar, Saibal & Mukherjee, Vivekananda, 2006. "Entrepreneurial culture, occupational choice and tax policy," MPRA Paper 24104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Tax policy, venture capital, and entrepreneurship," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 175-203, January.
    6. Hamid Beladi & Saibal Kar, 2015. "Skilled and Unskilled Immigrants and Entrepreneurship in a Developed Country," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 666-682, August.
    7. Hamid Beladi & Saibal Kar, 2014. "Unemployment Benefits and Entrepreneurship," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 122-128, March.
    8. Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, 2003. "Public Economics and Startup Entrepreneurs," CESifo Working Paper Series 877, CESifo.
    9. Kar, Saibal, 2009. "International labor migration, asymmetric information and occupational choice," MPRA Paper 24106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 2004. "Financing New Investments Under Asymmetric Information: A General Approach," Working Paper 1017, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    11. Jean-François Tremblay, 2009. "Business Taxation and Venture-Capital-Financed Innovation," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(2), pages 141-161, June.
    12. Mirjam van Praag, 2003. "Initial Capital Constraints Hinder Entrepreneurial Venture Performance: An empirical analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 887, CESifo.
    13. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 2006. "Financing and Taxing New Firms under Asymmetric Information," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(4), pages 471-502, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Florian Scheuer, 2014. "Entrepreneurial Taxation with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 126-163, May.
    2. Christiane Clemens, 2008. "Imperfect Competition and Growth with Entrepreneurial Risk," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(2), pages 180-206, May.
    3. Andreas Wagener, 2001. "Entrepreneurship and Social Security," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(3), pages 284-315, May.
    4. Parker, Simon C., 1999. "The optimal linear taxation of employment and self-employment incomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 107-123, July.
    5. Oana Secrieru & Marianne Vigneault, 2004. "Public Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship," Staff Working Papers 04-10, Bank of Canada.
    6. repec:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:180-206 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Moresi, Serge, 1998. "Optimal taxation and firm formation:: A model of asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1525-1551, September.
    8. Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, 2003. "Public Economics and Startup Entrepreneurs," CESifo Working Paper Series 877, CESifo.
    9. Li, Yuanyuan & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2017. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 127-141.
    10. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. Gerhard Clemenz & Mona Ritthaler, 1992. "Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 12-26, Spring.
    12. Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    13. Bieta, Volker & Broll, Udo & Siebe, Wilfried, 2014. "Collateral in banking policy: On the possibility of signaling," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 137-141.
    14. Simon C. Parker, 2003. "Does Tax Evasion Affect Occupational Choice?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 65(3), pages 379-394, July.
    15. Longhofer, Stanley D., 1997. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 249-267, July.
    16. Werner, Arndt, 2011. "Abbruch und Aufschub von Gründungsvorhaben: Eine empirische Analyse mit den Daten des Gründerpanels des IfM Bonn," IfM-Materialien 209, Institut für Mittelstandsforschung (IfM) Bonn.
    17. Safavian, Mehnaz & Sharma, Siddharth, 2007. "When do creditor rights work?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 484-508, September.
    18. Hyytinen, Ari & Takalo, Tuomas, 2008. "Investor protection and business creation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 113-122, June.
    19. Christophe Chamley, 1983. "Entrepreneurial Abilities and Liabilities in a Model of Self-Selection," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 70-80, Spring.
    20. Andrew E. Burke & Aoife Hanley, 2003. "How Do Banks Pick Safer Ventures? A Theory Relating the Importance of Risk Aversion and Collateral to Interest Margins and Credit Rationing," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 8(2), pages 13-24, Summer.
    21. Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank loans," Staff Reports 90, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    entrepreneurship; unemployment; occupational choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stéphane Pallage (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crefeca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.