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Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules

Author

Listed:
  • Marie Obidzinski

    (Université Paris Panthéon Assas, CRED UR 7321, 75005 Paris, France)

  • Yves Oytana

    (CRESE UR3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté, F-25000 Besançon, France)

Abstract
We characterize the socially optimal liability sharing rule in a situation where a manufacturer develops an artificial intelligence (AI) system that is then used by a human operator (or user). First, the manufacturer invests to increase the autonomy of the AI (i.e., the set of situations that the AI can handle without human intervention) and sets a selling price. The user then decides whether or not to buy the AI. Since the autonomy of the AI remains limited, the human operator must sometimes intervene even when the AI is in use. Our main assumption is that users are subject to behavioral inattention. Behavioral inattention reduces the effectiveness of user intervention and increases the expected harm. Only some users are aware of their own attentional limits. Under the assumption that AI outperforms users, we show that policymakers may face a trade-off when choosing how to allocate liability between the manufacturer and the user. Indeed, the manufacturer may underinvest in the autonomy of the AI. If this is the case, the policymaker can incentivize the latter to invest more by increasing his share of liability. On the other hand, increasing the liability of the manufacturer may come at the cost of slowing down the diffusion of AI technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2024. "Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules," Working Papers 2024-08, CRESE.
    • Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-08
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    liability rules; artificial intelligence; inattention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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