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Measuring and Changing Control: Women's Empowerment and Targeted Transfers

Author

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  • Attanasio, Orazio
  • Carneiro, Pedro
  • AlmÃ¥s, Ingvild
  • Armand, Alex
Abstract
This paper studies how targeted cash transfers to women affect their empowerment. We use a novel identification strategy to measure women's willingness to pay to receive cash transfers instead of their partner receiving it. We apply this among women living in poor households in urban Macedonia. We match experimental data with a unique policy intervention (CCT) in Macedonia offering poor households cash transfers conditional on having their children attending secondary school. The program randomized whether the transfer was offered to household heads or mothers at municipality level, providing us with an exogenous source of variation in (offered) transfers. We show that women who were offered the transfer reveal a lower willingness to pay, and we show that this is in line with theoretical predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Attanasio, Orazio & Carneiro, Pedro & AlmÃ¥s, Ingvild & Armand, Alex, 2015. "Measuring and Changing Control: Women's Empowerment and Targeted Transfers," CEPR Discussion Papers 10973, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10973
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    7. Ariel Fiszbein & Norbert Schady & Francisco H.G. Ferreira & Margaret Grosh & Niall Keleher & Pedro Olinto & Emmanuel Skoufias, 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers : Reducing Present and Future Poverty," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2597.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cash transfers; Empowerment; Gender; Intra-household;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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